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I. INTRODUCTION

In 2013, the Delaware Chancery Court issued an opinion that reverberated loudly in
Silicon Valley. In the case of In re Trados Inc. Shareholder Litigation ("Trados"),' the
court scrutinized the action of a board of directors controlled by venture capital investors.
Specifically, the court considered the board's decision to sell Trados Incorporated (the
"company" or "Trados") for an amount that, in accordance with customary Silicon Valley
stock terms, resulted in payouts to venture capital funds holding preferred stock but no
payouts to common shareholders. After a lengthy trial, the court ultimately found that the
transaction was fair to the common shareholders because of the company's limited
prospects. 2 Yet the case was notable for the court's sharp critique of the board for failing
to more vigilantly serve common shareholders. 3
The case inspired a wave of law firm memos and client alerts speculating about effects
on venture capital financing terms. 4 Leading law firms, acting through the National
Venture Capital Association's legal forms group, developed an elaborate contractual "sale
right" intended to contract around the case's holding.5
Legal scholars also took note of the case.6 In particular, they focused on language in
the opinion adopting a rule of "common maximization." 7 Under this approach to conflicts
between common and preferred shareholders, a board has a paramount duty to pursue value
for the common holders even when preferred holders have negotiated for control of the
board.8
In this Article, I check back in on Trados by asking lawyers whether the case affects
1. There have been two opinions issued in the Trados litigation. The first related to a motion to dismiss.
See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009). The other was
a trial court opinion. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17 (Del. Ch. 2013). Unless specified otherwise,
I use "Trados" to refer to the trial court opinion.
2. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 78 ("[T]he directors breached no duty to the common stock by agreeing to
a Merger in which the common stock received nothing. The common stock had no economic value before the
Merger, and the common stockholders received in the Merger the substantial equivalent in value of what they had
before.").
3. See id. at 45 ("[P]laintiff proved at trial that six of the seven Trados directors were not disinterested and
independent, making entire fairness the operative standard. This finding does not mean that the six directors
necessarily breached their fiduciary duties, only that entire fairness is the lens through which the court evaluates
their actions.").
4. See infra Part II (describing law firm memos discussing Trados).
5. See NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL Ass'N, NVCA MODEL VOTING AGREEMENT n.53 (2018) [hereinafter,
NVCA VOTING AGMT.] (referencing Trados).
6.

See Robert P. Bartlett III, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as Means to an End, 38 SEATTLE U. L.

REv. 255, 290-95 (2015) (criticizing the court's reasoning for failing to recognize the board as a venue for
bargaining over the company's future); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, A Theory ofPreferredStock,
161 U. PA. L. REv. 1815, 1874-900 (2013) (discussing Trados in articulating an over-arching "theory ofpreferred
stock"); Charles R. Korsmo, Venture Capital and Preferred Stock, 78 BROOK. L. REv. 1163, 1165, 1185-89
(2013) (discussing Trados as a basis for "reassess[ing] the law's treatment of preferred stock in the venture capital

context"); Elizabeth Pollman, Startup Governance, 168 U. PA. L. REv. (forthcoming, 2019) at 30-32, 54-57
(discussing Trados); Simone M. Sepe, Intruders in the Boardroom: The Case of Constituency Directors, 91

WASH. U. L. REv. 309, 320 & n.12 (2013) (discussing Trados in an economic analysis of constituency directors);
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Poor, Pitiful, orPotently PowerfulPreferred, 161 U. PA. L. REv. 2025, 2039 (2013) (discussing
Trados in a response to Bratton and Wachter).
7. See infra Part II.A (describing the rule of common maximization and its theoretical alternatives).

8.

See id
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how they document venture capital financings or advise boards on exit transactions. This
Article relies on original interviews with 20 lawyers, most of whom work for leading
Silicon Valley firms. 9 These lawyers are predominantly "startup lawyers"-a distinct
segment of the leal industry that guides high-risk startups through formation, financing,
and eventual exit.
I observe that Trados has a modest but noticeable effect on their advice to clients.
Interviewees report that a mix of Silicon Valley norms and practical impediments thwart
1
efforts to contract around Trados at the time a venture capital fund initially invests.I But
interviewees report that Trados does affect the process of selling a startup. Most noticeably,
boards are more systematic in assessing the value of continuing as a company.12 At the
margins, Trados may even result in special allocations to common shareholders (payments
13
to common shareholders in excess of their base entitlement). Though this customary
practice appears relatively consistent across interviewees, the consensus does not
necessarily extend to more conceptual matters. The interviewees do not agree on whether
Trados announced a new rule, and they do not converge on a single articulation of the
applicable fiduciary standard. 14
Beyond capturing customary practice around Trados, the interviews provide a rare
glimpse of the counseling moment when judicial pronouncements are transmitted to
corporate managers. This presents an opportunity to examine the reach of Delaware courts
as they seek to regulate the innovation economy from afar. After all, as Edward Rock stated
in his influential depiction of Delaware jurisprudence, "what the business lawyer tells the
15
Yet, there has
client-rather than what the judge announces to the world-is the 'law."'
been very little systematic study of how corporate lawyers actually translate judicial
16
pronouncements into client advice.
On this broader conceptual point, the interviewees describe a distinct business
environment where Delaware law has muted effects. Due to a combination of resource
restraints, litigation economics, and market realities, startups do not prioritize adherence to
corporate caselaw. 17 In this environment, judicial broadcasts of corporate law principles
might have less influence than they have with publicly traded companies. 18
I argue that this weaker "signal strength" should influence the court's judicial form.
Though ambiguity may serve a recognized function in Delaware jurisprudence, a fuzzy

9.
10.

See infra Part III (describing the practice environment of the interviewees).
For an overview of the tasks performed by startup lawyers, see generally Abraham J.B. Cable, Startup

Lawyers at the Outskirts, 50 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 163 (2014). See also John F. Coyle & Joseph M. Green,

Startup Lawyering 2.0, 95 N.C. L. REv. 1403 (2016-17). See also infra Part III (describing the practice focus of
the interviewees).

11. See infra Part IV.B (considering whether Trados has affected drag-along rights or resulted in adoption
of the NVCA sale right).
12. See infra Part IV.C.3.
13. See infra Part IV.C.4.
14. See infra Part IV.C.5.
15.

Edward Rock, Saints and Sinners. How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?, 44 UCLA L. REv.

1009, 1096 (1997).
16. See id. at 1106 ("The mechanism by which Delaware opinions influence conduct is ultimately an
empirical question, the full description of which awaits further research.").
17. See infra Part V.A.1.
18. See id.
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doctrine of judicial intervention has an especially high cost in a context where boards are
unable or unlikely to engage in procedural cleansing through independent board
committees or disinterested shareholder votes.19 In this setting, I recommend that Delaware
courts both clarify triggers for fairness review and strive to define right-sized standards of
conduct informed by existing customary practice.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II provides an overview of Trados and
reactions by practitioners and legal scholars. Part III describes the interviewees and their
practice environment. Part IV describes the customary practice following Trados,
including enhanced board process and additional payments to common holders attributable
in part to the case. Part V identifies doctrinal and theoretical implications of the
observations.
II. TRADOS AND REACTIONS BY COMMENTATORS
The Trados litigation has been in the spotlight since the court issued an initial opinion
in connection with a motion to dismiss in 2009.20 The litigation remained prominent as the
case went all the way to trial, resulting in a voluminous second opinion in 2013 that
elaborated on the court's earlier decision.21 This Part summarizes key aspects of the 2013
opinion and reactions by practitioners and legal scholars.
A. The Court'sHolding
In Trados, the court confronted at least three key questions: (1) does the Trados fact
pattern amount to a cognizable conflict of interest for directors affiliated with preferred
shareholders, (2) if so, what fiduciary standard applies to the conflicted directors, and (3)
was the transaction at issue fair to the common shareholders?
First, the court held that board members affiliated with venture capital investors were
conflicted when approving a merger resulting in payment of a liquidation preference to
venture capital funds holding preferred stock. 2 Although the conflict may at first appear
obvious based on the disparate payouts to common and preferred holders, the liquidation
preference had been negotiated between the venture capital funds and an independent
board. Once an insider strikes a fair bargain with an independent board, courts will not
necessarily scrutinize the performance of that agreement.23 Accordingly, the court's
analysis of the conflict hinged on the timing of the sale.24 Drawing an analogy to longrecognized conflicts between debt (creditors) and equity (shareholders), 2 5 the court noted
19. See infra Part V.A.2 (explaining circumstances that frustrate procedural cleansing).
20. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 2225958 (Del. Ch. July 24, 2009)
(denying the defendants' motion to dismiss).
21. See supra note I (describing the 2009 and 2013 opinions).
22. A liquidation preference is an attribute of preferred stock that entitles the holder to be repaid its
investment in connection with a merger or other sale transaction. When a startup is sold, a preferred holder can
elect to receive its liquidation preference or instead convert into common stock. When a company is sold for an
amount below the liquidation preference, the preferred holders will elect to receive the preference and the
common holders will not receive a payout. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Opportunity-Cost Conflicts in Corporate
Law, 66 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 51, 63-64 (2015) (explaining the operation of a liquidation preference).
23. See id. at 67 (citing DEL. GEN. CORP. L. § 144 regarding conflict-of-interest transactions).
24. See id. at 68 (describing the plaintiffs' claims in Trados).
25. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 49 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing the preferred stock as
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that a liquidation preference creates incentives to act conservatively and to prematurely
accept acquisition proposals in circumstances where common shareholders might prefer a
more risky strategy of continuing as a standalone company.26 In these circumstances,
common shareholders have nothing to lose and at least a remote chance of gaining by
continuing. Preferred shareholders, in contrast, bear real risk in continuing because doing
so jeopardizes their liquidation preference. 27
Having determined that the venture capital designees were conflicted, the court then
imputed that conflict to the board's facially independent directors based on the "web of
interrelationships that characterizes the Silicon Valley startup community" and a resulting
"owingness" to the venture capital investors.28 The court also found that other directors
holding management positions at Trados were conflicted based on a management incentive
29
plan providing for cash bonuses in connection with the sale.
After concluding its conflict analysis, the court then addressed the thorny question of
to whom fiduciary duties are owed when the interests of common and preferred
shareholders conflict. On this point (the "beneficiary question"), prior precedent and
commentary proposed at least three competing theories.
* Under the rule of common maximization, a board owes its primary duty to
common shareholders when the interests of preferred shareholders and
common shareholders come into conflict. 30 The board's duty is to maximize
the value to common shareholders as residual claimants-in other words, to
pursue all plausible value of continuing as a standalone company rather than
accepting a sale price at or around preferred stock liquidating preferences.
* Under the rule of enterprisemaximization, a board's duty is to maximize the
value of the entity, regardless of how proceeds will be distributed among
shareholders pursuant to stock terms. 31
* Under the control-contingentapproach, the fact that common holders ceded
board control to preferred holders should be taken into account in evaluating
fiduciary duty claims. Under this approach, a preferred-controlled board
could favor the interests of preferred holders. 32
"debt-like").
26. See id. ("The different cash flow rights of preferred stockholders are particularly likely to affect the
choice between (i) selling or dissolving the company and (ii) maintaining the company as an independent private
business.").
27.

For alternative (narrower) readings of the case, see infra Part V.C. 1.

28.

In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 54-55.

29. See id. at 54. A management incentive plan (MIP) is a form of executive bonus plan with payouts
conditioned on selling the company at or above a specified price. An MIP incentivizes an executive to seek a sale
transaction that the executive would otherwise resist because it will result in the executive losing his or her job.
See id at 58 ("VC-backed portfolio companies commonly adopt plans similar to the MIP to incent management
to favor exits.").
30. See Strine, supra note 6, at 2028 ("[Tlhe law suggests that when push comes to shove, the board has a
duty to prefer the common's interests, as pure equity holders, over any desire of the preferred for better treatment
based on some generalized expectancy that they will receive special treatment beyond their contractual rights.").
31. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 1885-86 (describing enterprise maximization); Douglas G.

Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People's Money, 60 STAN L. REv. 1309, 1323-28 (2008) (discussing
enterprise maximization and relevant caselaw).

32.
follows:

Jesse Fried and Mira Ganor have argued for the control-contingent approach. They describe it as
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The Trados court specifically referred to each competing theory33 and ultimately
endorsed common maximization: "[G]enerally it will be the duty of the board, where
discretionary judgment is to be exercised, to prefer the interests of the common stock-as
the good faith judgment of the board sees them to be-to the interests created by the special
rights, preferences, etc.... of preferred stock." 34
Having determined that the board was conflicted and that it owed its primary duty to
the common shareholders, the court then analyzed whether the transaction was "fair" to the
common shareholders. In applying this fairness standard-Delaware fiduciary law's most
stringent 35 -the court sharply rebuked the board's process and its failure to specifically
consider the effects of a sale on common holders. 36 The court, however, was persuaded by
the defendants' valuation expert that the company in fact had no substantial prospects for
a turnaround, so zero was a fair price for the common stock. 37 In short, the court was
critical of the board's conduct but ruled in favor of the board because of the company's
poor prospects.
B. The Court'sStyle
In considering how lawyers translate Trados into client advice, it is helpful to go
beyond what the court held and to consider how the court delivered the message.
One conspicuous feature of the opinion is its thick factual narrative. Tallying over 60
pages, the opinion includes a detailed description of the company's underlying business
and key inflection points in its 20-year operating history, such as acquisitions of other
38
3940
companies,
management changes, 3 9 financing transactions,
product development

A common-controlled board is free to serve the interests of common shareholders at the expense of
the preferred shareholders and aggregate shareholder value. In contrast, a preferred-controlled board
can make business decisions that serve the preferred at the expense of common, as long as those
decisions can be defended as in the best interests of the corporation.
Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture CapitalistControl in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L. REv. 967,

993 (2006). Note that Fried and Ganor's formulation of the control-contingent approach included an overriding
obligation that all directors act "in the best interests of the corporation." When the Trados court summarized the
control-contingent approach, it omitted this constraint on director conduct. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 38-40.
The court's more aggressive formulation echoes the sentiments of commentators who have argued for elimination
of fiduciary restraints in connection with preferred-common conflicts. See Baird & Henderson, supranote 31, at
1329-33 (describing a "contractarian solution" to preferred-common conflicts).

33.

The court described the control-contingent approach as follows: "[A] board elected by the common

&

stock owes duties to the common stock holders but not the preferred stock, but a board elected by the preferred
stock can promote the interests of the preferred stock at the expense of common stock." In re Trados, 73 A.3d at
17 n.16 (citing Fried & Ganor, supra note 32). The court described enterprise maximization as follows:
"[Directors should have a duty to maximize enterprise value, defined in the common-preferred context as the
aggregate value of the returns to the common stock plus the preferred stock, taking into account the preferred
stock's contractual rights." In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 17 n.16 (citing Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6; Baird
Henderson, supra note 31).

34.
35.
36.

In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 40-41.
See id at 55 (describing fairness review).
See infra text accompanying notes 51-53.

37.

See supra text accompanying note 2.

38.
39.
40.

See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 23.
See id at 25-27.
See id at 21-25.
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milestones,41 and the sale process at the center of the case.42 It appears that eight years of
litigation provided the court with a trove of background facts to set the stage for its analysis.
Equally notable is the court's attention to the distinctive context of Silicon Valley.
Scholars from a range of disciplines have studied the region-as a specialized financial
market,43 an economic cluster, 4 a labor market,45 and a social phenomenon.46 Similarly,
the Trados court drew heavily from academic literature. The court explained that venture
capital investors are at odds with founders and other common holders because "[t]he cash
flow rights of typical VC preferred stock cause the economic incentives of its holders to
47
and "[t]he VC business model
diverge from those of the common stockholders"
48
reinforces the economic incentives that the preferred stock's cash flow rights create."
The court looked to academic literature in concluding that facially independent directors
are beholden to venture capital investors because of "the web of interrelationships that
49
characterizes the Silicon Valley startup community." Repeatedly, the court took judicial
notice of Silicon Valley's exceptionalism, or at least signaled that fiduciary principles
might operate differently in this context. 50
Finally, the court's condemning tone makes an impression. The court was particularly
critical of the process the Trados board followed in approving the sale. By failing to
specifically consider the effects of the transaction on common stockholders, the board "did
not understand .. . their job."51 Worse yet, their experience and sophistication meant they'
"fully appreciated the diverging interests" of the common and preferred, yet they "refused
to recognize the conflicts they faced."52 Their testimony at trial was no more than a
"vigorous and coordinated effort" to "recharacterize their actions retrospectively" and
53
"show that they somehow blundered unconsciously into procedural fairness." With all of
this finger wagging, the court's ultimate holding in favor of the defendants feels like a

See id at 24.
See id at 28-34.
43. See, e.g., PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER, THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (2d ed. 2006) (providing
economic analysis of venture capital).
44. See, e.g., Michael E. Porter, Clusters and the New Economics of Competition, 76 HARV. Bus. REV.
(Nov.-Dec. 1998) (identifying Silicon Valley as "one of the world's best-known clusters" of economic activity).
45. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructureof High Technology IndustrialDistricts: Silicon
Valley, Route 128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L. REv. 575, 587-92 (discussing the work of
AnnaLee Saxenian).
46. See, e.g., Mark C. Suchman & Mia L. Cahill, The Hired Gun as Facilitator: Lawyers and the
Suppression ofBusiness Disputes in Silicon Valley, 21 L. & Soc. INQ. 679 (1996) (discussing Silicon Valley from
a sociological perspective).
47. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 49 (Del. Ch. 2013) (citing Bratton & Wachter, supra
note 6, at 1832).
48. See id at 50 (citing D. Gordon Smith, The Exit Structure of Venture Capital, 53 UCLA L. REv. 315,
316, 345 (2005)).
49. See id. at 54 (citing Fried & Ganor, supra note 32, at 988).
50. For other recent Delaware decisions acknowledging a distinctive business environment in Silicon
Valley, see Frederick Hsu Living Tr. v. ODN Holding Corp., No. 12108-VCL, 2017 WL 1437308, at *5, *28
(Del. Ch. Apr. 14, 2017) (referring to the "highly networked Silicon Valley community" and discussing the
incentives of venture capital investing); Sandys v. Pincus, 152 A.3d 124, passim (Del. 2016) (discussing
relationships among venture capitalists and entrepreneurs in assessing a board member's independence).
51. In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 62.
52. Id. at 62.
53. Id. at 56.
41.
42.
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surprise ending. 54
Overall, Trados is an example of what Edward Rock identifies as the Delaware court's
"normative/narrative" style. While there may be a temptation to reduce caselaw to
"algorithms"-rules that spit out concrete and consistent results-Delaware courts take a
different approach.5 5 They instead announce open-ended principles coupled with fact
intensive analysis and sharp critiques of specific conduct.
The opinion has all of the
hallmarks of the genre: announcement of broad principles, 57 thick factual description, and
sharp rebukes for perceived procedural failures despite a holding in favor of the defendants.
C. Reactions by Practitioners
Starting with the court's 2009 opinion, Trados caught the attention of lawyers and law
firms. A number of blog entries and law firm memos (together, the "practitioner materials")
pondered the effects of the case. 5 8
The practitioner materials generally described the case as a hollow victory for the
defendants. They noted that the court's application of the rigorous faimess standard
resulted in years of litigation and scrutiny, regardless of the outcome. 59
The practitioner materials focused largely on ways to prevent litigation in the Trados
fact pattern. Some of these commentaries focused on potential changes to customary
venture capital financings-in other words, ex ante contracts. For example, practitioners
considered whether the "drag-along rights" already included in most venture capital
financings might be altered or adapted to give venture capital investors the ability to cause
a sale of the company free from judicial scrutiny.60 The practitioner materials also focused

&

54. See supra Part II.A (discussing the court's holding that the transaction was ultimately fair to the
common holders because of the company's limited turnaround potential).
55. See Rock, supra note 15, at 1014 ("There is a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware
corporate law largely involves standards, but then to try to reduce it to a set of rules."). Rock describes the
tendency to articulate rules as one that "naturally emerges from teaching Corporations and trying to help students
synthesize cases into useful principles or algorithms." Id
56. See id. at 1015-16 (describing the normative-narrative approach); see also William T. Allen, Ambiguity
in Corporate Law, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 894, 900 (1997) (discussing his opinions as consisting of a "grand
principle" combined with a "highly specific" application that is hard to generalize to a rule); Jill E. Fisch, The
PeculiarRole of the DelawareCourts in the Competitionfor Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 107581 (2000) (describing Delaware fiduciary law as consisting of "indeterminate" standards applied in "a fact and
case specific manner").
57. In particular, the court described the applicable standard of conduct through the famously murky
concept of "good faith." See in re Trados Inc. S'holders Litig., 73 A.3d 17,40-41 (Del. Ch. 2013) ("[T]he standard
of conduct for directors requires that they strive in good faith and on an informed basis to maximize the value of
the corporation for the benefit of its residual claimants .... ).
58. See, e.g., Venture Capital Investing: Can the Liquidation Preference of Preferred Stock Over the
Common Stock Be Protected Where the Common Stock Receives Little or Nothing in an Exit?, LATHAM
WATKINS: CLIENT ALERT (Oct. 21, 2010), https://www.1w.com/thoughtLeadership/protecting-the-liquidation-

preference-in-venture-capital-investing (discussing the effects of the Trados case).
59. See, e.g., David J. Berger, Delaware Court of Chancery Upholds Trados Transaction as Entirely Fair,
HARV.
L.
SCH.
F.
ON
CORP.
GOVERNANCE
AND
FIN.
REG.
(Sept.
3,
2013),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/03/delaware-court-of-chancery-upholds-trados-transaction-as-entirelyfair/ ("Although the Trados directors were ultimately found not liable, the transaction was the subject of years of
litigation-a nearly inevitable result once a court finds that a majority of the board is conflicted and therefore
applies the entire fairness standard.").
60. See, e.g., Michael Kendall & C. Stephen Bigler, The Illusory Preference, THE DAILY DEAL (Feb. 22,
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on how board deliberations and sale process could be enhanced to avoid, or stand up to,
judicial review. Recommendations included increased use of valuation experts,
6
independent board committees, and disinterested shareholder approval.
Perhaps the clearest indication of practitioner interest in Trados was an alteration to
the model legal forms produced by the National Venture Capital Association (NVCA). The
NVCA is a trade group formed by venture capital funds.62 One of the more prominent
NVCA initiatives is the promulgation of model legal forms for venture capital financings.
Leading Silicon Valley firms collaborate to provide these comprehensive, annotated legal
63
documents at no charge on the NVCA website. Although firms still maintain proprietary
forms, the NVCA's model legal documents can be an important reference point for
64
establishing what is customary or "market" within Silicon Valley.
In explicit response to Trados, the NVCA legal forms group added a new variation to
the forms-a "sale right." Under the terms of this sale right, venture capital investors
would have (1) a shareholder-level right to put the company up for sale and (2) a right to
The
require the company to redeem the preferred stock at any resulting offer price.
without
company
the
to
sell
a
right
investors
give
to
was
provision
the
of
effect
intended
the board leading the charge, thereby avoiding the board-level conflicts at issue in Trados.
67
but its existence
As discussed below, the sale right has not been widely adopted,
community.
Valley
Silicon
in
the
of
Trados
prominence
the
evidences
D. Reactions by Legal Scholars
Legal scholars also showed a strong interest in Trados. In particular, they focused on
the court's endorsement of common maximization. An insightful exchange between thenChancellor Leo Strine, on one side, and Professors Bratton and Wachter, on the other side,
is representative.
Bratton and Wachter criticized Trados for imposing on the board a dictate of common
maximization. First, they noted the logical implications of the standard. Common
shareholders in a failing company will always prefer to gamble on continuing, no matter
how speculative and destructive of remaining company value, when the sale price falls
below preferred stock liquidation preferences.68 In that situation, common shareholders

2010), https://www.goodwinlaw.com/~/media/Files/Publications/Attorney/o20Articles/2010/KendallTheDaily
Deal_2_22_201 0.pdf ("Investors who can negotiate for the right to trigger the drag-along by themselves without
the requirement of a board vote may avoid the fiduciary issues raised by the Trados case entirely."). Drag-along
rights permit one group of shareholders to force another group of shareholders to cooperate with a sale of the
company. I describe these rights, and proposed changes in response to Trados, in Part IV.B.1 below.
61. See, e.g., Douglas N. Cogan et al., Corporate and Securities Alert: In re Trados - Important Lessons
for Directors on FiduciaryDuties to Common Stockholders, FENWICK & WEST (Sept. 18, 2013) (suggesting use
of independent board committees, disinterest shareholder votes, or alternative entities such as LLCs).
62. Who We Are, NAT'L VENTURE CAP. Ass'N, https://nvca.org/about-us/ (last visited Feb. 1, 2019)
(describing the NVCA as "[s]erving the venture community as the preeminent trade association").
63. See NVCA VOTING AGMT., supra note 5, at n.51.
64. See infra Part I.B (reporting that interviewees rely on NVCA forms as an important benchmark for
negotiations).
65. See supra text accompanying note 5.
66. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 1892 (describing the NVCA sale right).
67. See infra Part IV.B.2 (describing the NVCA sale right).
68. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 1889 ("Under a common stock-maximization norm, any result that
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might be viewed as playing with house money (or more accurately, preferred holders'
money). They argued that forcing the board to align with these incentives ignored the
"broader transactional context" of an "ex ante bargain" by which the company "gave up
the option to delay" in exchange for capital.69 By imposing a standard at odds with these
expectations, common shareholders could "disrupt the ex ante bargain in search of holdup
value." 70
Worse yet, according to Bratton and Wachter, doctrinal and practical impediments
prevent venture capital investors from developing contractual workarounds.71 For
example, Bratton and Wachter considered the NVCA sale right, which they described as
"convoluted and clever" but incapable of practically solving "the Trados problem." 72
Among other problems, they noted, Delaware caselaw may give a company significant
leeway in delaying payment of a redemption right. 73
Strine, in stark contrast, defended Trados and its endorsement of common
maximization. First, Strine suggested, without elaboration, that the rule of common
maximization had theoretical limits that curbed the extreme logical implications suggested
by Bratton and Wachter. According to Strine, Bratton and Wachter presented a caricature
of common maximization: "[T]hey cite no decisions in which any court has ever required
preferred stockholders in control to engage in casino-like gambling and to pursue strategies
without a bona fide potential for success that would leave creditors at unfair risk." 74
Strine then took exception to Bratton and Wachter's reading of the implicit bargain
underlying venture capital contracts and described a very different understanding of the
parties:
[Venture-capital investors] are not the only ones who take risks. Many earlystage companies have common stockholders who have made company-specific
investments just as real as those made by the preferred, although not always in
purely monetary ways. Employees work "on the come," and even some suppliers
do. And some investors buy common stock. Many of these equity holders accept
risk on the promise that the company is going to do what it says and try to take a
risky technology or service idea and turn it into a viable profit generator.
Besides reading the implicit bargain differently than Bratton and Wachter, Strine took
a substantially different view of preferred stockholders' ability to contract around the case.
He pointed to typical features of preferred stock, such as protective provisions and
wipes out the common is vulnerable to a 'might have waited' complaint."). See also Cable, supra note 22, at 89
(arguing that a strong version of common-maximization "requir[es] a preferred-controlled board to pursue
extreme long-shot opportunities on behalf of the common").
69. Id. at 1893-94.
7 0. Id.
71. Bratton and Wachter also discussed the shortcomings of drag-along rights, which may require common
shareholders to cooperate with a sale favored by preferred shareholders. They noted that the typical drag-along
provision still requires board support for any sale of the company because the Delaware statute compels board
involvement in mergers. Id at 1891. Those issues are discussed in detail below. See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing
proposed modifications of drag-along rights).
72. Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 1893-94 (discussing Delaware caselaw that limits a board's
authority to pay dividends even when the company is contractually committed to doing so).
73. Id
74. Strine, supra note 6, at 2038.
75. Id. at 2037.
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liquidation preferences, as an indication of preferred stockholders' bargaining
capabilities. He also suggested that investors could use entirely different instrumentssuch as high-yield debt coupled with warrants-to escape the shareholder paradigm in
favor of a position as creditors. 77 In sum, he expressed "reasons to doubt that preferred
stockholders lack sufficient market clout to protect their interests at the negotiating
table." 78
III. THE INTERVIEWEES

This Article considers Trados through semi-structured interviews with practicing
lawyers. 79 This Part briefly describes the interviewees and their practice environment.
A. Location
With one exception, the interviewees practice in Silicon Valley or other Bay Area
locations.80 Despite the emergence of entrepreneurial hubs in other parts of the country,
Silicon Valley remains the epicenter of venture capital activity.
B. PracticeFocus & Exposure to DelawareLaw
I sought out "startup lawyers" who form emerging
In selecting interviewees,
companies, negotiate and document venture capital investments, and advise boards in
connection with exit transactions.83 In describing their practice, the interviewees use terms
such as "general corporate lawyer" or "general counsel.",84 It would be inaccurate,
however, to describe these lawyers as generalists in any broad sense. Instead, they
specialize in guiding startups through particular stages of development (generally before

76. Id. at 2029, 2036-37.
77. Id at 2036-37.
78. Id at 2029 (noting that preferred holders do bargain for liquidation preferences and protective
provisions and stating that preferred could obtain a redemption right or invest in high-yield debt).
79.

Interviews were conducted pursuant to an interview guide listing the following topics: method of

keeping informed about legal developments, the frequency with which legal developments affect advice to clients,
familiarity with Trados, the case's impact on venture capital financing terms, and the case's impact on advice to
boards.

80.
office.

One interviewee practices outside of California, but within a firm that has a substantial Silicon Valley

81. NAT'L VENTURE CAPITAL Ass'N, NVCA YEARBOOK 2017 15, 23 [hereinafter, NVCA YEARBOOK],
https://nvca.org/nvca-2017-yearbook-go-resource-venture-ecosystem/ (reporting that in 2016 over half of assets
under management in the venture capital industry were attributable to California-headquartered funds and that
over half of venture capital investments were made in Califomia-headquartered startups).
82. 1 located initial interviewees through personal and professional contacts and then asked for referrals to

other potential interviewees (i.e., a "snowball sampling" technique).
83. See supra note 10 (listing sources discussing the role of startup lawyers). Two of the interviewees selfidentify as mergers and acquisitions lawyers, meaning they represent startups primarily in sale transactions and
not in venture capital financings. See Interview with Lawyer #3, at 1; Interview with Lawyer #18, at 1.
84. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at 1 (referring to "traditional" and "general" corporate lawyers in
contrast to specialists); Interview with Lawyer #11, at I (explaining that the interviewee acts as general counsel

for early-stage companies); Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (describing his role as being a virtual general
counsel); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 1 ("I'm a generalist."); Interview with Lawyer #17, at I (describing the
interviewee's role as "outsourced general counsel").
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the company has an initial public offering of stock) in a particular business environment
(the startup and venture capital "ecosystem").85 In other words, these lawyers focus on
matters commonly encountered by startups in Silicon Valley.
Startup lawyers are not the only kinds of lawyers who might have something to say
about Trados. The interviewees interact with lawyers in their firms' mergers and
acquisitions practice groups ("M&A lawyers") 86 and with lawyers practicing out of
Delaware offices ("Delaware counsel"). 87
In fact, one of my more surprising observations was the extent to which the
interviewees, despite being familiar with Trados, sometimes disclaim deep expertise in
corporate caselaw. Though the interviewees mostly form and represent Delaware (as
opposed to California) corporations, they view theirjob as "issue spotting" and may leave
finer points of Delaware caselaw to other specialists. 9 As one interviewee puts it, startup
lawyers do not spend time "in front of the judiciary." 90
According to interviewees with long practice experience, there is a trend in Silicon
Valley towards increasing specialization. These interviewees report that "lifecycle
representation" of a startup once extended to advising fully mature companies on a broad
range of topics relating to corporate governance and federal securities laws. But
increasingly startup lawyers have given way to an array of specialists in capital markets,
federal securities law compliance, executive compensation, Delaware law, and mergers
85.

See Interview with Lawyer #10, at I (describing the interviewee's typical client as "two people and an

idea" with a "skill set that tapers off' when the company becomes publicly traded); Interview with Lawyer #11,
at I (explaining that the interviewee represents companies from early stages to exit); Interview with Lawyer #17,
at I (stating that the interviewee always represents startups). Some interviewees claimed further specialization
within a particular industry focus. See, e.g., Interview with Lawyer #1, at I (claiming expertise in the "life sciences
industry vertical"). The interviewees are not unanimous in reporting that they focus on privately held companies.
See Interview with Lawyer #1, at I (indicating that the lawyer represents clients for "the full lifecycle of the

client"); Interview with Lawyer #5, at 1 (describing his practice as being relationship based and spanning the life
of the company); Interview with Lawyer #15, at I (indicating that the interviewee handles substantial public
company governance); Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (describing typical clients as two people in a garage
through the "entire lifecycle"); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 1 (describing representation of startups through the
entire lifecycle, including as public companies). But several interviewees note a trend towards deferring to other
specialists once a company achieves public company status. See infra text accompanying notes 91-92.
86. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at 1 (referencing M&A lawyers and Delaware counsel); Interview with
Lawyer #11, at 1 (stating that the firm has a "pure M&A group" in addition to the emerging business group);
Interview with Lawyer #14, at 1 (describing specialists in venture capital, corporate governance, and M&A);
Interview with Lawyer #16, at 1 (discussing the firm's M&A and corporate governance specialists); Interview

with Lawyer #18, at 1 (discussing the firm's M&A practice group).
87. See infra Part III.B (discussing the interviewees' interactions with Delaware counsel).
88. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 2 (reporting that "most of our clients are Delaware incorporated");
Interview with Lawyer #10, at I (estimating that 99% of clients are Delaware corporations and 1% are Delaware

LLCs or California corporations formed as such "by accident"); Interview with Lawyer #13, at I (reporting being
familiar with Delaware corporate law more than California corporate law); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 1
(reporting that most clients are incorporated in Delaware); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 3 (describing the
interviewee's expertise as California law and Delaware corporate law).
89.
See Interview with Lawyer #7, at I (stating that M&A specialists follow Delaware cases, while startup
lawyers "rely on summaries" and "issue spot"); Interview with Lawyer #9 (reporting that corporate lawyers are
not as informed about Delaware caselaw as Delaware specialists); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 3 (suggesting
that I should speak to an M&A specialist because they would be more familiar with Trados). But see Interview

with Lawyer #14, at I ("I can handle 93% of Delaware questions.").
90. Interview with Lawyer #2, at 1.
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and acquisitions.91 According to one interviewee, early models of startup lawyering
envisioned lawyers working on a venture capital financing in the morning and a registration

statement for a public offering in the afternoon, but increasing specialization at large firms
means "that model is not followed anymore."92
This hyper-specialization raises the question of whether startup lawyers are the right
lawyers to ask about Trados's effects. If M&A lawyers and Delaware counsel are the true
connoisseurs of Delaware case law, perhaps they are the best observers. For a number of
reasons, I determined that startup lawyers were the most relevant practitioners for this
study.
First, the interviewees explain that they maintain primary responsibility for most
merger transactions. 93 Although M&A specialists or Delaware counsel might be available
for particularly large or complex transactions, Trados is highly relevant to the type of
modest or small exit that startup lawyers continue to primarily handle.
Second, startup lawyers guide a startup through key points in the startup lifecycle,
starting with company formation, continuing through major financing transactions, and
typically ending with an acquisition. 94 Accordingly, they have visibility to all of the key
moments when Trados might affect advice to clients, including negotiation of venture
capital financing terms, construction of corporate governance mechanisms (such as board
composition), structuring of executive compensation, and board deliberations at the time
of exit.
Third, interviewees describe a number of ways in which their work is indirectly
influenced by Delaware law even if they do not consider themselves to be primary
consumers of judicial opinions. According to many of the interviewees, firms feature
significant "knowledge management" functions. Interviewees identified internal firm
91. See Interview with Lawyer #5, at 1 (describing a decline in "relationship based" representation of a
company through all lifecycle stages); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 1 (reporting that when the interviewee
graduated from law school "everyone wanted to be a generalist" but that the practice became more specialized);
Interview with Lawyer #17, at 3 (explaining that the interviewee initially handled a larger variety of matters,
including IPOs and public company work, but that legal reforms in the early 2000s made it more difficult to
continue with public company work); Interview with Lawyer #19, at I (observing a push to specialize but
"resist[ing]" the trend based on the belief that well-rounded lawyers provide better client service and a more
fulfilling career).
92. See Interview with Lawyer #18, at 1-2. These observations are consistent with academic accounts of
Silicon Valley law firms. The origin story of these firms centers on a group of charismatic firm founders who
convinced clients to stay with them, rather than seeking out San Francisco corporate firms, through the company's
full growth cycle and maturation. Lawrence M. Friedman et al., Law, Lawyers, and Legal Practice in Silicon
Valley: A PreliminaryReport, 64 IND. L.J. 555, 560 (1989). But Silicon Valley law firms have transformed into
national law firms, and national law firms from other regions have set up shop in Silicon Valley. See Cable, supra
note 10, at 189 (noting that prominent Silicon Valley firms are now listed among the Am Law 100 and that many
Am Law 100 firms now feature Silicon Valley offices).
93. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at I ("[A]ll general corporate lawyers should be able to process a general
M&A deal."); Interview with Lawyer #9, at I (reporting that the interviewee retains primary responsibility for
mergers under $300 million); Interview with Lawyer #11, at I (reporting that the interviewee has handled an
estimated 150 acquisitions even though the firm has an M&A group); Interview with Lawyer #18, at 1 (reporting
"plenty of instances" when startup lawyers handle M&A transactions despite the firm having an M&A practice
group).

94. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at I (indicating that the lawyer represents clients for "the full lifecycle
of the client"); Interview with Lawyer #5, at I (describing his practice as being relationship based and spanning
the life of the company, but also describing a trend towards specialization for company representation).
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communications as a source of information about legal developments, 95 and they described
systems for updating firm forms to reflect major developments.96 In some cases, these
systems extended beyond transactional documents and included fiduciary duty
presentations to boards. 97 Some firms invest heavily in these efforts by hiring full-time
knowledge management personnel. If those systems are effective, startup lawyers act on
a firm-wide assessment of Delaware law, whether or not they know it.
Of course, not all startup lawyers practice in firms with robust knowledgemanagement systems. Some interviewees practice in small firms or in large firms with
relatively small Silicon Valley offices. Regardless of firm size, the level of formality in
producing and maintaining firm forms differs. 99
Interviewees indicate that industry-wide collaboration can substitute for, or
supplement, intra-firm systems. Silicon Valley is perceived as a norms-laden environment
with a strong sense of what is "market" and appropriate for a venture capital financing and
exit transaction. 100 In particular, interviewees identify the NVCA forms project as a useful
example of standardization across firms. 101
95. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 2 (describing client alerts, handbooks, and email updates produced by
the firm); Interview with Lawyer #3, at I (describing compilations of materials circulated within the firn);

Interview with Lawyer #4, at I (describing the firm as "pretty good" at keeping the lawyers up to date); Interview
with Lawyer #11, at I (reporting that the people follow Delaware law within the firm and that the "beauty of a

big firm" is that it has "a lot of resources"); Interview with Lawyer #12, at 2 (describing practice group meetings
as a primary source of information about legal developments); Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (discussing firmgenerated alerts and memos on key developments); Interview with Lawyer #15, at I (discussing weekly email
about legal developments). But see Interview with Lawyer #5, at I (claiming that there is no advantage to firmgenerated updates versus externally produced materials).
96. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 2-3 (describing knowledge management personnel and their role in

updating firm forms); Interview with Lawyer #2, at I (describing the process for updating finn forms to reflect
legal developments); Interview with Lawyer #4, at 1 (emphasizing the importance of firm forms and estimating

approximately annual updates from legal developments); Interview with Lawyer #7, at I (discussing the process
within the firm for updating forms to reflect legal developments).
97. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2 (describing standardized board presentations); Interview with
Lawyer #12, at 2 (reporting that the firm has standardized board presentations regarding fiduciary duties).
98. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at I (discussing the internal updates by a knowledge management group
within the firm); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 1 (discussing the role of knowledge management personnel in
updating firm forms to reflect legal developments); Interview with Lawyer #11, at I (discussing full-time
personnel who update firm forms); Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (discussing "reformed lawyers" who work
for the firm as knowledge management personnel); Interview with Lawyer #15, at I (discussing the role of
knowledge management lawyers in updating firm forms); Interview with Lawyer #19, at I (discussing the role of
knowledge management and professional development personnel in updating firm forms and educating lawyers

within the firm about legal developments).
99. See Interview with Lawyer #13, at 1 (explaining a former firm of the interviewee spent significant
resources updating firms but that the interviewee's current firm was less systematic about updating forms);
Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (reporting that it can be "a little murky" who "owns the form"); Interview with

Lawyer #17, at 1 (describing a small firm with informal forms).
100. See Interview with Lawyer #10, at I (explaining that Silicon Valley is a "repeat player economy" with
a small number of firms (the "five families") being a "center of gravity"); see also Brian J. Broughman & Jesse
M. Fried, Carrots & Sticks: How VCs Induce EntrepreneurialTeams to Sell Startups, 98 CORNELL L. REV. 1319,

1341 (2013) ("Silicon Valley is a close-knit community with its own norms and ways of doing business.").
101.
See Interview with Lawyer #12, at 3 (reporting a preference for NVCA forms); Interview with Lawyer
#14, at 2 (reporting involvement in the NVCA drafting committee and describing the forms as informative);

Interview with Lawyer #15, at I (discussing the possibility of using NVCA forms because they are "easily
negotiated" and used "across the country"); Interview with Lawyer #17, at I (describing a preference for NVCA
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Finally, interviewees report regular and systematic contact with the Delaware bar.
10 2
Most interviewee firms form
Some interviewee firms have opened Delaware offices.
Layton & Finger or Morris,
Richards,
as
such
firms,
Delaware
with
existing
relationships
103
on call for consultation on
are
firms
Delaware
These
LLP.
Tunnell
&
Arsht
Nichols,
law updates through
corporate
regular
provide
also
and
they
matters,104
client
particular
presentations.105
in
person
and
written materials
C. Number
I conducted a total of 20 interviews. I believe this number is sufficient to identify
customary practice in response to Trados. A small number of firms handle the vast majority
of venture capital financings in Silicon Valley. For example, six law firms handle over 75%
of West Coast venture capital financings. o0 As discussed above, the interviewees report
that their law firms are a primary source of information about legal developments and have
107
systems in place to standardize work product within firms.
Regarding the broader conceptual insights presented in Part V, this Article should be
considered an exploratory study. As such, it seeks to make a primarily theoretical
10 8
contribution to be tested by future confirmatory research.
IV. TH-E MODEST

EFFECTS OF TRADOS

This Part reports my primary observations regarding the effects of Trados on lawyers'
customary advice to clients. In sum, the case has not had the effects on venture capital
financing terms predicted by some commentators. It has had a modest but noticeable effect
on sale process. In particular, lawyers now advise boards to more systematically consider
continuation value and, in some cases, push consideration to common shareholders in
excess of their baseline entitlements.

forms).
102. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 2 (describing the firm's Delaware office); Interview with Lawyer #4
(describing the firm's Delaware office); Interview with Lawyer #8, at I (describing consultation with the firm's
Delaware office on a "regular basis" and whenever a situation is "more than bread-and-butter" or "quasi-

litigious"); Interview with Lawyer #9, at 1 (discussing regular presentations by the firm's Delaware office).
103. See Interview with Lawyer #13, at 1 (discussing frequent consultation with, and regular updates from,
these firms); Interview with Lawyer #15, at 1 (discussing regular presentations by these firms); Interview with
Lawyer #19, at 1 (discussing updates from these firms).
104. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at I (reporting that the firm consults Delaware counsel "all the time");
Interview with Lawyer #13, at 1 (stating that the interviewee consults Delaware counsel every few months).

105.

See Interview with Lawyer #2, at I (describing periodic presentations by Delaware firms); Interview

with Lawyer #10, at I (observing that it is in a Delaware firm's "business interest" to "maintain contact points"

with Silicon Valley firms); Interview with Lawyer #11, at 1 (discussing updates from prominent Delaware firms);
Interview with Lawyer #12, at 1 (stating that a prominent Delaware firm is "pretty proactive" about giving the
firm regular updates); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 1 (reporting that the interviewee's firm works with and
receives updates from Delaware firms); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 1 (describing regular updates from

Delaware firms).
106.
107.

See PITCHBOOK, GLOBAL LEAGUE TABLES 29 (2017) (listing most active law firms by deal location).
See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text (discussing knowledge management functions within

firms).
108. See ROBERT A. STEBBINS, EXPLORATORY RESEARCH IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 1-9 (2001) (explaining
the role of exploratory research in formulating grounded theory to guide future research).
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A. Familiaritywith Trados
Nearly all of the interviewees are familiar with Trados at some level. 109 Some
interviewees know the case immediately by name and are able to give relatively detailed
accounts of its facts and holdings. One interviewee describes it as "the most important
[case] of my career." 110 Other interviewees recognize the case after some prompting. It is
always possible that some interviewees claim familiarity with the case to avoid
embarrassment. One interviewee humorously su ests that a corporate lawyer would
"pretend" to know any case in order to look good.
But it was my strong sense, based on
the full body of interviews, that Trados was, in fact, a familiar case, especially for those
who practiced for a substantial period before the first opinion in 2009.
A number of interviewees comment that Trados is somewhat distinctive in its
notoriety. They report that caselaw does not frequently affect their work representing
private companies because most high-profile Delaware judicial opinions are tailored to
public company deals.112 For these lawyers, keeping up to date on contracting conventions
(whether particular deal terms were "market") matter more than keeping up to date on
Delaware corporate law. 113

109. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 3 (reporting being "pretty familiar" with Trados and describing the
basic fact pattern); Interview with Lawyer #3, at 2 ("I am familiar with [Trados], but not too in depth on that
one."); Interview with Lawyer #4, at I (stating that the lawyer is "definitely aware" of Trados); Interview with
Lawyer #5, at 1 (describing Trados as a rare case that matters in the startup context); Interview with Lawyer #7,
at I (identifying Trados as a case discussed within the firm but reporting that "it's been a while" and "things have
calmed down" in terms of the case's impact); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 1 (reporting that Trados "certainly
came up"); Interview with Lawyer #9, at I (reporting some familiarity with the case); Interview with Lawyer #10,
at I (stating that Trados is familiar and that the case is referenced when considering drag-along rights or when
the common is getting nothing); Interview with Lawyer #12, at 1 (indicating that Trados was affecting a deal the
interviewee was currently working on); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 1-2 (describing Trados as a case that the
interviewee has read multiple times); Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (reporting that the interviewee is
"extraordinarily" familiar with Trados); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 1 (reporting that the interviewee is
"generally familiar" with Trados); Interview with Lawyer #19, at I (reporting that the interviewee is "of course"
familiar with Trados and was "hit from every angle" by updates regarding the case); Interview with Lawyer #20,
at 2 (reporting being familiar with Trados). I generally told interviewees that I wanted to interview them about
how Delaware case law affects their practice. I did not generally mention Trados in advance of the interview.
Four interviewees knew we would discuss Trados because they were familiar with my study or because a referring
interviewee described the study in the course of arranging an introduction.
110. Interview with Lawyer #13, at 3.
111. See Interview with Lawyer #9, at 1.
112. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 2 ("I'm mainly on the private company side of things... so there
aren't a ton of court cases that end up changing the advice I'm giving."); Interview with Lawyer #3, at 1 (stating
that influential judicial opinions are "actually pretty rare in Silicon Valley" because of the case law's focus on
"public-public deals"); Interview with Lawyer #5, at 1 (stating that legal developments affect his work with
startups "much less frequently" than his work with publicly traded companies); Interview with Lawyer #11, at 2
("Cases are not in the nomenclature."); Interview with Lawyer #12, at I (reporting that Delaware case law
"doesn't come up a lot"); Interview with Lawyer #12, at 2 ("We're too busy to have time to read cases and
pontificate, as much as I'd like to do that."). But see, e.g., Interview with Lawyer #15, at I (reporting that recent
Delaware caselaw is increasingly focusing on private company governance); Interview with Lawyer #18, at 2
(observing that a number of Delaware cases regarding provisions of M&A agreements also affect private
companies).
113. See Interview with Lawyer #2, at I (reporting that "course of dealing" affects the practice more than
legal developments).
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B. Ex Ante Contracts
The commentary following Trados contemplated two primary changes in venture
capital financings: increased use of drag-along rights and adoption of the NVCA's new
sale right. Interviewees have little familiarity with the NVCA sale right. While some
interviewees report small changes in drag-along rights, the interviewees generally
downplay the importance of these provisions.
1. Drag-Along Rights
Drag-along rights are typical in venture capital financings.114 The customary
provision allows some collection of shareholders to require other shareholders to vote for
1 15
In its most traditional form, a drag-along
a merger or tender their shares in a stock sale.
right can only be triggered if the board approves the transaction. The reason is in part
doctrinal-most typical forms of acquisition (asset sales and mergers) require board
approval by statute.116 This requirement of board approval means that a traditional form
of drag-along provision cannot circumvent limits set by Trados-the board eventually has
11 7
to weigh in on the transaction and at that point the Trados conflict emerges.
By removing the reference to board approval in a drag-along right, however, the
provision does create one narrow avenue for the preferred holders to sell the company
without the board ever chiming in. Specifically, preferred shareholders could use such a
drag-along right to force a stock sale-once the specified group of shareholders triggered
the rights, all other parties to the agreement would be required to tender their shares and
sign onto a customary stock purchase agreement.
Interviewees disagree on whether there has been a change in drag-along rights in
response to Trados. Some interviewees suggest that it has been more common since Trados
to draft drag-along rights without requiring board approval.118 Other interviewees report
119
Others, however,
that drag-along rights in general have become "more widespread."
any such trend is
that
doubt
or
rights,120
drag-along
in
change
report seeing no meaningful
114. According to a deal study by Cooley LLP, over 80% of financings handled by the firm from 2014
through 2018 included drag-along rights. See Trends, COOLEY Go, https://www.cooleygo.com/trends/ (last
visited Feb. 11, 2019). See also Interview with Lawyer #4 (estimating that 90% of venture capital deals already
included drag-along rights prior to Trados). But see Interview with Lawyer #10, at I (suggesting that only 60%
of deals include drag-along rights).
115. See NVCA VOTING AGMT., supranote 5, at 6-12 (providing a form drag-along provision).
116. SeeDEL.GEN.CORP.L.§251.
117. See supra note 71 (discussing doctrinal impediments to using drag-along rights to circumvent Trados).
See also Interview with Lawyer #1, at 7 (stating that there is no way to "waive fiduciary duties" of the board to
"consider the rights of all shareholders" when evaluating a merger). A recent Delaware case underscores the
limitations of drag-along rights in the face of fiduciary duty problems. See In re Good Tech. Corp. S'holder Litig.,
C.A. No. 1150-VCL, 2017 WL 2537347 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2017).
118. See Interview with Lawyer #2, at I (stating that drag-along provisions omit the requirement of board
approval more frequently in recent years); Interview with Lawyer #13, at I (reporting instances of removing the
board approval from a drag-along provisions but also suggesting that clients have given some "push back" against
that formulation). But see Interview with Lawyer #10, at 1 (suggesting that Trados has had the effect of advising
against a drag-along right triggered by just the preferred and the board because of fiduciary duty concerns).
119. Interview with Lawyer #1, at 6. See also Interview with Lawyer #14, at I (suggesting a substantial
increase in drag-along rights compared to 15 years ago).
120. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 1 (stating that there is "no difference" in terms since Trados and that
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related to Trados. 12 1

Though interviewees are divided in assessing Trados's effects, they are more unified
in downplaying the significance of drag-along rights in general. As described further
below, a combination of legal and practical barriers prevents preferred shareholders from
using a drag-along right to sell a Silicon Valley startup:
* Acquirers have a strong preference for mergers or asset sales-both of which
are negotiated with the target board and effected at the company levelrather than acquiring stock from individual shareholders.122 Interviewees
describe stock acquisitions using drag-along rights as idiosyncratic and
unadvisable 123
* In Silicon Valley, acquisitions are often focused on acquiring talent rather
than hard assets or specific technology-"the buyer wants the team." 1 24
Founders and employees, who hold key human capital, are typically the
largest common shareholders.125 Accordingly, it would be self-defeating to

any uptick in drag-along rights would not be considered meaningful because they were already typical); Interview

with Lawyer #6, at I (suggesting that any discussion of removing the board trigger from drag-along provisions
was just "optics" and has not had any lasting effect); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 1 (reporting that Trados made
no difference in "up front" contracting); Interview with Lawyer #8 (stating that Trados did not affect venture
capital financings and the firm did not change its approach to drag-along rights); Interview with Lawyer #11, at
1 (stating that the case has not affected drag-along rights); Interview with Lawyer #12, at 1 (indicating that the
interviewee's firm considered taking the board out as a trigger in the firm's form but decided "net-net it is better
having it in" and observing no change to drag-long rights in general); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 (reporting

"no difference" in drag-along rights); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 1 (reporting that Trados did not change the
terms ofventure capital financings).
121. See Interview with Lawyer #5, at 1 (stating that Trados has had a "pretty negligible impact on venture
capital terms" and that any change in drag-along rights is "not framed in terms of Trados"); Interview with Lawyer
#14, at 1 (noting an increase in drag-along rights but suggesting that "it's not strict causation"); Interview with
Lawyer #20, at 2-3 (doubting that any changes in financing terms are attributable to Trados).
122. See PETER V. LETSOU, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND AcQUsITIONS 33-36,

136-39 (2006) (discussing the basic structure of mergers and asset sales); Interview with Lawyer #10, at 1 (stating
that it is "bizarre" to write a drag-along provision without board approval in the trigger because board is required
under the merger statute); Interview with Lawyer #13, at I (explaining that a merger is a preferable deal structure);
Interview with Lawyer #15, at 3 (reporting that removing the board from the drag-along trigger does not work
well because the board must approve a merger); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 ("1 can't imagine using a stock

sale [using a drag-along].").
123.

See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 1 (asserting that it is "virtually impossible to sell a company without

board approval" and having experience with only one acquirer who prefers stock sales and may use drag-along
rights); Interview with Lawyer #5, at 1-2 (describing a rare "hostile takeover of a private company," which had
"a tremendous number of downsides"); Interview with Lawyer #6, at 1 (stating that an acquirer negotiating

directly with shareholders is "not happening"); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2 (identifying one large acquirer
who prefers stock purchases and might use a drag-along right). See also Interview with Lawyer #3, at 2 (discussing
the difficulty of conducting a sale process when founders in management provisions are not cooperating).
124. Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2. See also Interview with Lawyer #3, at 3-4 ("The workforce generally

has some value in addition to the IP, and you need to reward them somehow."); Interview with Lawyer #5, at 2
("People are a big part of what you're acquiring.").
125.

See Interview with Lawyer #14, at 3 (describing founders and employees as the primary common

shareholders); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 1 (suggesting that the effects of Trados are limited by the fact that
founders and employees are the most common shareholders and ordinarily receive compensation for future
employment with the acquirer); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 (stating that it is "virtually impossible" to buy a
company without the support of the founders).
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126
pursue a transaction without support from the bulk of common holders.

Enforcing a drag-along right may be prohibitively expensive.127
Controlling shareholders also have fiduciary duties that may be implicated
128
by forcing a sale at the shareholder level.
According to the interviewees, drag-along rights play a modest role of giving a
majority of shareholders "leverage"l29 when dealing with smaller shareholders ("cats and
to extract hold-up value or are nonresponsive.131 But
dogs")130 who would otherwise
they are almost never exercised.
In fact, a number of interviewees suggest that a heavy-handed drag-along right, even
if more easily enforced, would defy customary understandings of how control should be
allocated between founders and venture capital investors. According to one interviewee,
the prevailing norm is "shared control" over exit decisions.133 Several interviewees
emphasize that the current deal climate is particularly founder friendly and that it would be
134
far outside market norms for an investor to request sole discretion over exit decisions.
*
*

2. NVCA Sale Right
The NVCA's model forms group proposed a sale right in response to Trados. As
described above, this sale right aimed to take exit decisions out of the hands of the board

126. For a description of how founders and employees can resist an undesirable transaction, see Broughman
& Fried, supranote 100, at 1331-33.
127. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 1 (stating that most lawyers are "nervous about enforcement" of dragalong rights because shareholders can make procedural objections); Interview with Lawyer #16, at I (discussing
the enforceability of drag-along rights); see also In re Good Tech. Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11 580-VCL,
2017 WL 2537347, at *4 (Del. Ch. May 12, 2017) (suggesting that a court might refuse to enforce a drag-along
if a board violates its fiduciary duties in approving the applicable transaction).
128. See Interview with Lawyer #2, at 1.
129. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at I (describing a drag-along rights as "leverage" and not a practical
outcome).
130. See NVCA VOTING AGMT., supra note 5, at n.13 (suggesting that a "housekeeping" drag-along
provision intended to "prevent dissent by minority 'cat and dog' stockholders" is in the interests of all shareholder
constituencies).
131. See Interview with Lawyer #5, at 2 (reporting that drag-along rights are not usually triggered by just
preferred stock shareholders and usually can be triggered only with common shareholder and board approval too);
Interview with Lawyer #6, at 1 (describing drag-along rights as a tool for taking care of holdouts when both
classes of stock "mostly agree" on a sale); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 1 (suggesting that 90% of drag-along
rights are for "sweeping up" little shareholders rather than allocating sale control); Interview with Lawyer #16,
at 1 (reporting that drag-along rights are intended for "administrative purposes").
132. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (reporting that the interviewee has never seen a drag-along right
used); Interview with Lawyer #10, at I (reporting that the interviewee has never seen a drag-along right used);
Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2 (reporting only one instance in which the interviewee has seen attempted use of
a drag-along right); Interview with Lawyer #16, at I (reporting that the interviewee has never seen a drag-along
right exercised); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 (reporting that drag-along rights and "90% of provisions" in a
"standard VC deal" are never exercised).
133. See Interview with Lawyer #5, at 2 (reporting that very few drag-along provisions include just a
preferred trigger, that venture capital investors usually "don't even ask," and that the usual arrangement is "shared
control").
134. See Interview with Lawyer #4 (stating that a drag-along right without a board trigger is "a tougher up
front deal"); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 1 (indicating that founders are unlikely to negotiate away control rights
in the current market); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2 ("Fundamentally, founders aren't going to agree to it.").
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by giving preferred shareholders (1) a contractual right to put the company up for sale and
(2) a redemption right at any resulting offer price.13
Most interviewees are not familiar with the NVCA sale right or have not seen it
included in venture capital financings.136 A handful of interviewees have seen the sale right
included once or twice but view those transactions as idiosyncratic. 137
When I described the sale right, the interviewees were skeptical about its efficacy.
Some of their reasons for being skeptical echo their concerns about drag-along rights: it
would be the rare acquirer who would step into a sale process initiated over substantial
shareholder objection and without board leadership. As one interviewee states:
"Fundamentally, deals happen when pretty much everyone wants the deal to happen. You
don't drag people kicking and screaming.',138 They also note the difficulty of exercising
redemption rights under current Delaware law. 139
At times, the interviewees suggest a broader concern about any effort to craft a
contractual response to Trados. One interviewee explains that there is "only so much
contracting" you can do.140 Another interviewee explains that controlling outcomes by
contract is challenging because "it's very difficult early on to really understand where the
company is headed." 41 In other words, parties to a venture capital financing face an
incomplete contracting problem.
C. Deal Process
While the influence of Trados on ex ante contracts seems to be mild, interviewees
indicate that Trados does have noticeable effects on board process in connection with exit
transactions. Effects cited by interviewees include efforts to ratify transactions through
independent committees and shareholder votes, more formal consideration of effects on
common shareholders, and modest payments ("allocations") to common shareholders.
1. Trados Territory
Before considering how Trados affects customary board procedure, it is useful to
consider when the interviewees consider the case. In other words, what is a "Trados case"
135. See supra text accompanying note 66 (discussing the mechanics of the sale right).
136. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 7 (reporting that investor counsel has not asked for the sale right and
that it would be considered "pretty aggressive"); Interview with Lawyer #3, at 7 ("I haven't seen it."); Interview
with Lawyer #5, at 2 (reporting that the NVCA sale right is not being used); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2
(indicating that the interviewee has not seen the NVCA sale right included in deals); Interview with Lawyer #16,
at 1 (reporting that the interviewee never "had that appendix" in a deal).
137. See Interview with Lawyer #12, at I (reporting one instance ofthe sale right but with a foreign investor);
Interview with Lawyer #13, at 1 (reporting that a counterparty once tried unsuccessfully to use the sale right);
Interview with Lawyer #15, at 2 (stating that the interviewee has seen the right used once or twice but that it is

likely ineffective because a redemption "ends up in a food fight"); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 (reporting one
instance in which a non-Silicon Valley firm proposed the sale right); Interview with Lawyer #20, at 3 (reporting
one instance in which an investor requested the sale right but describing it as atypical).
138. Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2.
139. See Interview with Lawyer #2 (noting the limits on an investor's ability to enforce a redemption right
and the inevitability of some board involvement in any sale).

140.

Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2.

141. Interview with Lawyer #1, at 6. See also Interview with Lawyer #7, at I (reporting that contracting for
control over exit decisions is difficult because you are "so far from any understanding of what might happen").
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to these interviewees?
Most basically, the interviewees associate the case with a disappointing result for
common shareholders. They report thinking about the case whenever the common
shareholders get little or no consideration in a sale transaction. 142
Some interviewees, however, note problems with this broad interpretation. As one
143
A
interviewee states, "that puts [nearly] every case into Trados in our industry."
the
investors'
near
or
below
selling
of
sense
in
the
fail
startups
of
majority
significant
liquidation preference. 144 But interviewees explain that company failure does not always,
or even usually, result in real conflicts between common and preferred. One interviewee
notes that even when venture capital investors recover a significant portion of their
liquidation preference, that is a disappointing result by industry standards and not
materially different than a total loss in terms of overall fund performance.1 4 5 Moreover,
the realistic alternative to selling is not usually continuation-it is winding down and
liquidating with substantial losses for preferred and common.146 Accordingly, some
interviewees are less concerned about Trados in deals where the preferred takes substantial
losses too. 147
Ultimately, perceptions of litigation risk, as much as the severity of the conflict, seem
to dictate the level of sensitivity to Trados. Risk is determined in part by the likelihood that
the common stock does, in fact, have value as determined by the size of the "liquidation
stack," the company's cash reserves, and the company's projections if it can raise
But risk is also determined based on the composure of the common
additional funds.

142. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at 1 (suggesting that a Trados situation is where "the common don't get
much"); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2 (stating that Trados applies when the common gets "zilch" and a
liquidation preference is paid); Interview with Lawyer #10, at 2 (suggesting that the interviewee begins thinking
about Trados whenever the company is "going to have some unhappy shareholders"); Interview with Lawyer
#14, at 2 (reporting that Trados is considered "when you may not clear the stack or by a wide margin"); Interview
with Lawyer #17, at 1 (explaining that Trados applies when the company sells and all consideration goes to the
preferred); Interview with Lawyer #18, at 3 ("The threshold is a deal where the common is getting nothing.");
Interview with Lawyer #20, at 3 (reporting that the interviewee considers Trados when the common holders get
little or no consideration).
143. Interview with Lawyer #19, at 3.
144. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Incubator Cities. Tomorrow's Economy, Yesterday's Startups, 2 MICH. J.
PRIV. EQUiTY & VENTURE CAP. L. 195, 202 (2013) (reviewing evidence that most venture-backed startups fail to
return positive amounts to investors); Interview with Lawyer #18, at 3 (arguing that Trados is "not consistent
with the VC-backed model" because nine out often startups fail).

145. See Interview with Lawyer #19, at 3.
146. See also Interview with Lawyer #6, at 2; Interview with Lawyer #10, at 2 (suggesting that by the time
of sale, you might be about to send the company to Sherwood Partners, a prominent liquidator); Interview with
Lawyer #20, at 3 (describing Trados as unique because the company had the resources to keep operating).
147. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2 (suggesting that the case applies in "narrow circumstances" and not
when the company is running out of money); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2 (suggesting that Trados is of less

concern when it is "all up and to the right" and when "things are terrible"); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 3
(stating that the case is relevant when there is "more of a tumaround element" and not when there are "three
months left of gas in the tank and the board isn't putting more money in"); Interview with Lawyer #15, at 2
(asserting that there is no conflict in selling the company if there is no viable path to funding the company's
continued operation).
148. See Interview with Lawyer #5, at 3.
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shareholder base. Interviewees cited "estranged founder[s]"l49 and "litigious angels"1 50
with unusually large stakes as the biggest concern. 15 1 Finally, risk can result from more
deal-specific circumstances such as whether common shareholders previously expended
cash to exercise options.152
2. Independent Board or ShareholderApproval
Interviewees are understandably sensitive to judicial standards of review. One
interviewee explains that litigation under the fairness standard is time consuming and "time
is everything for these eople."l53 Another interviewee reports that the "business judgment
rule is everything."
Accordingly, the interviewees report that Trados motivates
companies to form independent committees of directors or seek disinterested shareholder
approval of transactions in order to cleanse the transaction and gain the benefit of the
deferential business judgment rule. 155
There are, however, significant practical impediments to forming an independent
committee of directors in this context. Founders serving on the board often receive bonus
payments in connection with a sale under a management incentive plan ("MIP") or receive
other compensation arrangements with an acquirer.156 Trados held that those kinds of
payments disqualified the recipients from being considered independent.' 5 7 Trados also
found that facially independent directors were conflicted due to informal relationships with
venture capital funds.
These same considerations may also be impediments to obtaining disinterested
shareholder approval. Founders, who may be conflicted due to an MIP, are often the largest
holders of common shares. Other smaller holders-former employees, vendors, or early
149.

Interview with Lawyer #6, at 1. See also Interview with Lawyer #8, at 3 (identifying a "former

disgruntled founder" as a source of litigation risk).
150. Interview with Lawyer #2, at 2. See also Interview with Lawyer #16, at 3 (identifying as a source of
risk investors who were converted into common in a recapitalization).
151. See Interview with Lawyer #15, at 3 (stating that the shareholder base determines litigation risk, with
particular emphasis on whether there are any common shareholders who invested large amounts or a "wingnut

founder").
152.
See Interview with Lawyer #3, at 10.
153.
Interview with Lawyer #5, at 3.
154. Interview with Lawyer #6, at 2.
155.
See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 3 (discussing independent board committees); Interview with Lawyer
#1, at 4 ("[W]e put the deal in front of the common."); Interview with Lawyer #6, at 1 (discussing independent

board committees and disinterested shareholder approval); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (reporting that
"optimally" a company seeks disinterested approval); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2 (observing increased use of
independent board committees but not disinterested shareholder approval); Interview with Lawyer #9, at 2

(suggesting that independent director or disinterested shareholder approval might be considered as a layer of
protection against a Trados claim); Interview with Lawyer #12, at 2 (reporting that Trados "absolutely" pushes
companies to get independent director approval); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 2 (stating that disinterested or

independent approval is more common following Trados).
156. See Interview with Lawyer #12, at 2 (suggesting that the presence of a management incentive plan
heightens concem about Trados). One interviewee noted this impediment to finding independent directors, but
also suggested that management incentive plans could be structured in ways that mitigate the conflict. See
Interview with Lawyer #5, at 2.

157.
158.

See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 45 (Del. Ch. 2013).
See id. at 54 (noting a "close business relationship" between a purportedly independent director and

venture capital investors).
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investors forced to convert in recapitalizations-may be understandably unmotivated to
consent to a transaction paying them little or nothing. 159
And
As one interviewee sums it up, "you're only as good as your options."
61
independent."1
is
no
one
and
noses
companies sometimes "count
Finally, it is difficult to discern the extent to which Trados actually drives the
shareholder approval process. For example, acquirers may require a high percentage of
shareholders (90-95%) to consent to a transaction or agree to liability provisions of a
that disinterested shareholder votes
merger agreement.162 Interviewees expressed the view163
law.
fiduciary
than
rather
side"
buy
the
by
are "driven
3. Common-Continuation Value
A number of interviewees report that preferred-controlled boards now more fully and
formally consider the effects of a transaction on common holders-what I will call
"common-continuation value." 1 64
In part, interviewees describe increasing formality. As one interviewee puts it, the
goal is to "force the board to say what it is feeling" by building a clear record of the analysis
in board minutes.165 Interviewees note that this cuts against the grain of historical practice
166
in Silicon Valley, where management and governance have traditionally been lean.
159. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2 (discussing the difficulty of getting common shareholders to join
merger agreements when the common stock is "out of the money"); Interview with Lawyer #6, at 1 (reporting
that it is challenging to find disinterested common shareholders).
160. Interview with Lawyer #2, at 2.
161. Id.; see also Interview with Lawyer #10, at 3 (explaining that independent directors are "not in the
network" for most companies); Interview with Lawyer #15, at 1 (stating that "you're lucky if you have a
disinterested director" so "everything is an interested transaction").
162. See Interview with Lawyer #2, at 2 (reporting that buyers require a high percentage of target
shareholders to approve a transaction); Interview with Lawyer #10, at 3 (stating that "the commercial baseline"
encourages high vote thresholds and not Trados); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2 (reporting that buyers require
90-95% buyer approval); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 2 (stating that acquirers will require near 100%
shareholder approval). Disinterested shareholder approval may be required under Section 280G of the Internal
Revenue Code to avoid additional tax on golden parachute payments. See Interview with Lawyer #3, at 6.
163. Interview with Lawyer #14, at 3.
164. See Interview with Lawyer #2, at 1 (reporting that because of Trados "a conversation about allocation
of proceeds needs to happen"); Interview with Lawyer #8, at I (describing Trados as requiring a process that
"considered common" holders); Interview with Lawyer #9, at 2 (suggesting that pre-Trados there was less
analysis by the board of whether the company could continue); Interview with Lawyer #10, at 2 (reporting that
Trados gave rise to "a notion" that the board has to "take into account what benefits the common shareholders").
But see Interview with Lawyer #18, at 4 (stating that it is "extremely rare" to have formal documentation of
common-continuation value).
165. Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2. See also Interview with Lawyer #1, at 6 (reporting that Trados
"certainly would affect the amount of documentation in the board minutes or the [board] process"); Interview
with Lawyer #4, at 1 (reporting that boards are now "significantly more sensitive to process and documentation
of alternatives"); Interview with Lawyer #5, at 4 (reporting that "[w]hat really happened is that people document
formally" consideration of the common stock); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (suggesting that you might "paper"
the analysis in "board language"); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2 (stating that Trados causes boards to be
especially careful about documenting board process); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 2 (stating that lawyers now
"document the discussion").
166. See Interview with Lawyer #10, at 2 (discussing the challenges of creating a formal record when
management is not sophisticated and find themselves at a "fall back" outcome of a disappointing merger);
Interview with Lawyer #18, at 4 (discussing an aversion to detailed minutes); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 2
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Beyond mere formality, interviewees describe meaningful exploration by boards of
alternative transactions and prospects for continued operations. In the course of approving
a sale, boards may investigate financing sources, the market for the company's product,
employee retention, and layoffs and cost-cutting measures.167 Given the cash-strapped
nature of most startups,168 this process focuses heavily on the availability of additional
investment or other forms of financing such as debt.169 This process is not so much a formal
valuation of the common stock, but rather a qualitative analysis of viability.
The analysis can be thought of as serving multiple purposes. Sometimes the analysis
confirms that there are no good alternatives to a proposed sale. Interviewees note that
companies often lack reasonable financing options to continue operations, have failed to
hit key development milestones, or are facing an exodus of employees.1 70 In these
circumstances, Trados might not be relevant practically or doctrinally. 17 1
In addition, considering common-continuation value is relevant to the faimess review
that a court will apply if it determines there is a Trados conflict. Fairness review includes
scrutiny of both transaction outcomes and board process.172 Formally considering
common-continuation value directly responds to one of the Trados court's sharpest
criticisms of that board's sale process.1 73
4. Allocations to Common
Some
transaction
liquidation
liquidation

interviewees suggest that a Trados-inspired board discussion can affect
terms. Interviewees report that a board might hold out for a deal that clears
preferences or request that preferred stock sacrifice some amount of its
preference so that consideration flows to common stock. 174 Preferred holders

(describing typical venture capital minutes as "Teflon").
167. Interview with Lawyer #6, at I (stating that Trados results in "focus on process" and "build[ing] a
record" that the company "is running out of money" and "went out for deals"); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 1-2
(reporting that boards consider employee defections, the market for the company's products, and availability of
additional financing); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2 (stating that boards consider and document declining
financial prospects, declining sales, competition, capital requirements, and lack of additional funding sources);
Interview with Lawyer #15, at 2 (reporting that a board will go "up and down Sand Hill Road" looking for
financing as part of the process); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 2 (describing a fact-intensive process that might
consider, among other factors, how hard the company has been shopped and the company's business prospects).

168.

See infra text accompanying notes 206-207 (discussing financing challenges faced by startups and the

practice of staging investments).
169. See supra note 167 (citing to interviewee statements referencing investigation of financing sources).
170. Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2 (recognizing that you cannot force investors to continue financing the

company); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2 (discussing "objective factors" that the company is failing).
171. As discussed above, some interviewees take the position that Trados does not apply in circumstances
where preferred holders also take substantial losses. See infra Part IV.C. I.

172. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 55-65 (Del. Ch. 2013) (describing the substantive
and procedural aspects of fairness).
173. See generally supra Part II.B (summarizing the court's sharp criticisms of the Trados board).
174. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 4 (discussing situations where preferred shareholders or note holders
are asked to sacrifice some consideration to common holders); Interview with Lawyer #2, at I (stating that "a

conversation about allocation of proceeds needs to happen" and that the common might be allocated proceeds if
the company has value); Interview with Lawyer #6, at I (reporting that a board might allocate consideration to
common in a "pure Trados case"); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (indicating that a company might seek to

"adjust the economics" ifthere is litigation risk under Trados); Interview with Lawyer #10 (describing an example
of a deal in which an investor considered waiving liquidation preference in part due to Trados); Interview with
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might even convert to common stock so that preferred and common holders receive
proportionate consideration. 17 5
Payouts to common holders may not be frequent or large. One interviewee describes
these allocations as a "nugget"176 and another interviewee describes them as "a pittance to
the common." 177 According to one interviewee, the "jaundiced view" of Trados is that it
1 78
But still,
makes preferred shareholders "overpay for negligible [common stock] value."
these possible substantive effects on transaction terms suggest that Trados has inspired
more than window-dressing procedure.
Whether common holders are allocated consideration appears to turn largely on
litigation risk. 179 One interviewee reports that boards "give the common a slice" as an
Another states that the amount paid to common holders is "a
"insurance policy."
function of risk and cost." 18 1
As with other topics above, one can question the degree to which Trados in particular
drives these allocations to common holders. Researchers have observed such payments in
periods prior to the case.182 In addition, several interviewees describe these allocations as
compensation for consent to the transaction rather than a product of fiduciary analysis. As
described above, Silicon Valley acquirers often require a high percentage of common
holders to approve a transaction, unrelated to Trados. 83 Common holders may need some
incentive to respond to requests for approval. 184 Accordingly, Trados is probably best
understood as operating "at the margins."

Lawyer #16, at 2 (discussing an example of preferred shareholder waiving their liquidation preference); Interview

with Lawyer #19, at 3 (discussing the possibility of allocating some consideration to common as part of the board
sale process). But see Interview with Lawyer #15, at 3 (stating that the interviewee has never seen an allocation
to common as a result of Trados).

175.

See Interview with Lawyer #12, at 2 (indicating that giving up the liquidation preference altogether is.

required to remove the Trados conflict).
176. See Interview with Lawyer #8, at 1.
177. Interview with Lawyer #2, at 1.

178.
179.

Interview with Lawyer #5, at 4.
See Interview with Lawyer #5, at 3 (reporting that the shareholders' capacity to sue might affect the

decision to allocate consideration to common); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (associating allocation to common

with litigation risk).
180.
181.
182.

Interview with Lawyer #6, at 1.
Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2.
See Broughman & Fried, supra note 100, at 1348 (observing allocations to common in sample

transactions from early 2003 and 2004).
183. See supra note 162 (discussing buyer approval requirements).
184. See Interview with Lawyer #2, at 2 (describing how buyers' approval requirements affect allocations to
common); Interview with Lawyer #9, at 2 (reporting that the interviewee might consider an allocation to common
in order to obtain the requisite shareholder approval); Interview with Lawyer #10, at 3 (citing a combination of
buyer approval requirements and Trados as motivating a waiver of liquidation preference); Interview with Lawyer
#11, at 2 (suggesting that allocations to common are motivated by buyers' high consent requirements); Interview
with Lawyer #12, at 2 (suggesting that a company might "push some consideration to common" in order to get

disinterested shareholder approval); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2 (discussing how a company might "buy the
common vote" by "cutting the common into the deal"); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 3 (discussing allocations
to common as part of "horse trading" over common shareholder approval).
185. See Interview with Lawyer #4, at 1.
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5. The Beneficiary Question
As described in Part II, the Trados court confronted a contested doctrinal question: to
whom are the board's fiduciary duties owed? In answering this question, the court
considered three competing theories: common maximization, the control-contingent
approach, and enterprise maximization. 186 Despite the court's apparent endorsement of
common maximization, the interviewees do not coalesce around any of these alternatives
and strike a less definite tone when discussing what I will call "the beneficiary question."
As an initial matter, interviewees do not agree on whether Trados altered common
understandings of fiduciary duties. Several interviewees state that Trados is not a
substantial departure from preceding caselaw but rather a reminder or amplification of
existing concepts.187 But others suggest that the case defied their understanding of the
board's obligations regarding preferred-common conflicts.18 8
Similar ambiguity surfaces when interviewees try to summarize their views of current
fiduciary law. In some instances, tones of enterprise maximization emerge. For example,
an interviewee summarizes the applicable standard as an obligation in "tough cases" to
"maximize value of the enterprise."l89 In contrast, other interviewees hint at common
maximization. One interviewee summarizes Trados as "preferencing the right[s]" of the
common holders.190 Another interviewee states that the case requires paying something to
the common because "you deprived future potential upside however small that might
be."1 9 1

Several interviewees perhaps suggest a fourth option in stating that the board owes a
186. See in re Trados Inc. S'holders Litig., No. 1512-CC, 2009 WL 222958, at *40-41 (Del. Ch. July 24,
2009) (discussing the court's references to the three competing theories).
187. See Interview with Lawyer #1, at 5 (stating that Trados "was reaffirming the way that the duty of loyalty
should have been working"); Interview with Lawyer #4, at I (explaining that the case was consistent with
established understandings between what was permissible at the board versus shareholder level); Interview with
Lawyer #5, at 3 ("We always worried about Trados as a theoretical claim."); Interview with Lawyer #6, at I
(explaining that "conservative lawyers" has always recommended a carve-out to common in Trados situations).
188. See Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2 (stating that the interviewee heard the "common-only" reading of
Trados and "didn't accept" it); Interview with Lawyer #12, at 2 (reporting that Trados surprised people "a little
bit" but is ultimately "common-sensical"); Interview with Lawyer #18, at 3 (reporting that Trados was
"surprising"); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 2 (reporting that Trados "surprised me"); Interview with Lawyer
#20, at 4 (reporting that Trados surprised the interviewee "a little").
189. Interview with Lawyer #6, at 2. See also Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2 (describing "a duty to all
shareholders to get best value for the company, including the value of continuing" rather than treating the
company as "your toy"); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (summarizing the board's duty as "mak[ing] sure you
get the best transaction" and that "it's better than continuing"); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2 (asserting that

preserving enterprise value is the "higher priority"); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2 (agreeing with the concept
of enterprise maximization); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 ("Most people like me assume that as long as you
maximize value it probably satisfies fiduciary duties."); Interview with Lawyer #18, at 3 (arguing that the
"enterprise view" is conceptually correct but recognizing that Tradosendorsed common maximization); Interview
with Lawyer #19, at 2 (describing the interviewee as "in the camp" of enterprise maximization but recognizing
that Trados endorsed common maximization).
190. Interview with Lawyer #1, at 3.
191. Interview with Lawyer #5, at 2. See also Interview with Lawyer #10, at 2 (stating that board members

understand they need to "do right by the common" and that preferred holders are not "the favorites of the courts");
Interview with Lawyer #14, at 3 (stating that the board's "[p]rimary duty is to the common"); Interview with
Lawyer #18, at 3 (explaining that "you have to look at the preferred as a contract and your primary duty is to the
common").
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duty "to all shareholders." 1 92 This ambiguous phrasing might signal that a fiduciary's role
is to mediate or reconcile competing interests of beneficiaries. Rather than choosing sides
(as common maximization and control-contingent suggest) or ignoring the conflict (as
enterprise maximization suggests), the fiduciary facilitates a negotiation and
compromise. 193
Amid these varied characterizations of fiduciary law what perhaps stands out most is
a reluctance to reduce the board's obligations to any tidy formula. Interviewees reject the
very specific outcomes mandated by the purest readings of the competing theories. They
balk at the suggestion that a board must pursue long-shot chances of succeeding as a standalone company. 194 They also reject the idea that a preferred-controlled board has special
195
Instead, some advanced an
license to act in the interest of preferred holders.
indeterminant formulation: the board owes its duties to all shareholders.
It is hard to know what to make of the interviewees' haziness around common
maximization and its theoretical alternatives. The beneficiary question has been the focal
196
Moreover, the court engaged with this
point of most academic treatment of the case.
academic debate and squarely endorsed common maximization in its opinion.197 Yet, the
192. See Interview with Lawyer #6, at 2 (describing a duty to "all shareholders"); Interview with Lawyer #4,
at 2 (using the "all shareholders" language); Interview with Lawyer #9, at 2 (stating that the directors "have a
duty to all shareholders inclusive of common and preferred" and "have to consider the shareholders in general");
Interview with Lawyer #13, at 3 ("Are preferred not shareholders? If you don't think of them as shareholders,
then don't call them shareholders."); Interview with Lawyer #15, at 2 ("You represent all shareholders, and even
more so the common shareholders."); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 (stating that the board owes its duties to
"all of the shareholders as a whole" and not just the common); Interview with Lawyer #19, at 2 (reporting that
pre-Trados the interviewee would advise board members they had a duty to "all shareholders").
193. The interviewees' customary practice illustrates how such a standard might operate. A board might
formulate a compromise of preferred and common interests by going forward with the transaction (to protect the
preferred holder's preference) conditioned on an allocation to the common (in recognition of the loss of
continuation value). See supra Part IV.C.4.
194. See Interview with Lawyer #6, at 2 (disagreeing that duties run "to common more so" and stating that
"you don't have to go for it on any chance"); Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (stating that it is "not practical" to
assess and pursue low continuation value); Interview with Lawyer #8, at 2 (objecting to the idea that fiduciary
duties require the board to "always run the thing into the ground"); Interview with Lawyer #11, at 2 ("I don't
necessarily believe that you have to follow a path that likely leads to zero."); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 3
(objecting to the idea that the board should turn down a transaction if the preferred can get 95% of their preference
and the chance of the common getting anything is "much less likely"); Interview with Lawyer #14, at 3 (stating
that the board's duty to common "should not be taken to extremes").
195. See Interview with Lawyer #7, at 2 (stating that in "no situation" would the preferred have special
license to favor the interests of the preferred); Interview with Lawyer #10, at 2 (reporting that the controlcontingent approach is not how the interviewee explains fiduciary duties to the board); Interview with Lawyer
#12, at 2 (reporting that a rule permitting the preferred-elected directors to act in the interest of the preferred
holders is "for sure" not correct); Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2 (voicing strong disagreement with the assertion
that preferred-elected directors can favor preferred holders); Interview with Lawyer #15, at 2 (stating that controlcontingent is "definitely not" the fiduciary standard"); Interview with Lawyer #17, at 2 (stating that "no lawyer"
thinks a preferred control board has special license to favor the preferred). According to one interviewee, "any
corporate lawyer" would tell you that a fiduciary "wears a different hat" in the boardroom and that there is a
"meaningful difference" between exercising a shareholder-level right and making a board decision. In other
words, it is common understanding that if a party to a financing wants to control a decision then that needs to be
specified in a shareholder-level agreement. Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2.
196. See supra Part 11.D (discussing reactions by legal scholars).
197. See supra notes 33-34 and corresponding text (summarizing the court's treatment of the three
alternative theories).
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interviewees disagreed on the applicable standard and whether it was changed by Trados.
In fairness, the court's discussion of the beneficiary question was not necessarily as
conspicuous in the opinion as it has been in academic accounts. The court did react to
framing by academics and viewed common maximization as the most useful phrasing on
the facts of Trados. But as explained above, the decision is mostly in the
narrative/normative style with almost platitudinal statements of general principle and sharp
rebukes of particular conduct-particularly the defendants' efforts to "recharacterize their
actions retrospectively" as common-regarding.1 98 Though the court did recite a rule of
common maximization, it did so in couched terms ("generally") and relegated competing
rules to a single footnote. 199 Subsequent extrajudicial dialogue suggests (as of yet
undefined) limits on the concept.200
Equally important, the customary practice emerging in the wake of Trados is basically
responsive to the opinion, regardless of any conceptual ambiguity. Reacting to the court's
sharp criticism of the Trados sale process,201 boards now more systematically consider
common-continuation value and alternatives to sale.202 The fact that this process
sometimes results in payouts to common holders suggests that the procedural
enhancements are more than cosmetic.203
In sum, transmission from court to board is not completely static free-the
interviewees lack consensus on key aspects of doctrine and vary in their familiarity with
the case. But the emerging customary practice does seem to be essentially responsive to
the case.
V. IMPLICATIONS

This final Part explores key implications for Trados doctrine and broader Delaware
jurisprudence. It starts by identifying an important theme in the interviews: Silicon Valley
startups do not optimize for fiduciary duty law to the same extent as public companies.
Specifically, startup boards are unlikely to rely on elaborate procedural mechanisms
(valuation experts, independent board committees, and disinterested shareholder votes) to
insulate themselves from litigation based on ambiguous fiduciary law. Against this
background, I argue that Delaware should strive to concretize and right-size fiduciary law.
I apply these insights to two ambiguities that surface in the interviews: what precisely
triggers fairness review in the Trados fact pattern and what constitutes fair process in those
circumstances?
A. What's DistinctiveAbout Silicon Valley?
This Subpart explores foundational questions for a judiciary charged with regulating
Silicon Valley startups. First, how attentive are startup boards to Delaware law? Second,
how should the answer to that question affect Delaware jurisprudence?

198.
199.

See supra Part II.B (describing the style of the opinion).
Id.

200.
201.

See supra text accompanying note 74 (discussing commentary by then-Chancellor Strine).
See supra notes 51-53.

202.
203.

See supra Part IV.C.3.
See supra notes 174-178.
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1. Muted JudicialInfluence
Commentators describe Delaware courts as being in dialogue with corporate
managers.204 But this metaphor suggests a certain intimacy or closeness with the audience.
In fact, Delaware law may be more like a broadcast.205 Instead of speaking directly with
most managers, Delaware jurists make pronouncements that are edited, amplified, and
distributed by intermediaries, such as lawyers. When judges communicate in this way, they
do not know if their message will come through clearly or even if the target audience will
tune in at all. The interviewees report that in Silicon Valley, as compared to other settings,
the court's signal is not always strong and the audience is not always fully engaged.
The interviewees report that resource constraints frustrate efforts to implement
Delaware caselaw. By design, startups are usually almost out of money. Their financing
options are limited because they frequently lack bankable assets or substantial revenues.20
When venture capital funds invest, they do so incrementally through installments
207
("stages") conditioned on meeting development milestones.
Interviewees relate how corporate governance has a cost that most startups cannot
afford.208 Startups have limited ability to recruit and compensate independent directors and
to fund special committees.209 The size of most private company deals may not justify the
teams of advisors that have become customary in public company acquisitions.210 Under
these conditions, even the most expert and enthusiastic advice can only go so far in
influencing client conduct. As one interviewee explains, "you can give all the legal advice,
but practicalities control." 2 11
Small deal size affects compliance in another, more subtle, way: it reduces the
probability of litigation in the average case. Litigation risk is a significant element of client
advice. Using Trados as an example, assessments of litigation risk influence the decision

204. See, e.g., William Savitt, The Genius of the Modern Chancery System, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REv. 570,
594 (describing "dialogue" between the court and corporate actors).
205. Edward Rock uses a similar metaphor in likening corporate law cases to "sermons." See Rock, supra
note 15, at 1016 (referring to Delaware's "corporate law sermons"). Even the sermon metaphor, however,

suggests a devoted audience. As described below, it is not clear that startup boards show up on Sunday.
206. See Bartlett, supra note 6, at 263 (discussing the financing challenges facing startups).
207.

See id at 263-64 (describing the structure of venture capital financing); Darian M. Ibrahim, The (Not

So) Puzzling Behavior of Angel Investors, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1405, 1411-13 (2008) (describing the practice of
staging investments in venture-capital financings).
208. See Interview with Lawyer #10, at 3 (describing a "disconnect" between the amount of process required
for a Delaware corporation and the amount available to most startups); Interview with Lawyer #11, at 2
(explaining that a company at the "unicorn stage" might pay for a legal memo regarding caselaw but that a "run
of the mill startup won't pay for that"); Interview with Lawyer #15, at 2 (explaining that companies have
sometimes raised relatively little institutional money and therefore have limited corporate governance).
209. See Interview with Lawyer #14, at 2 (stating that many sale transactions are not large enough to justify

"fund[ing]" a special committee). See also supra notes 160-161 (describing the difficulty of recruiting
independent directors to startups); see Bratton & Wachter, supranote 6, at 1888 ("The independent board regime
was designed with public companies in mind, not startups unable to reach the IPO stage."); Pollman, supra note

6, at 56 ("Most participants in the startup lack independence by design.").
210. See Interview with Lawyer #18, at 3 (stating that a company facing a Trados transaction is unlikely to
involve a banker or valuation expert); RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF
CORPORATE AcQuISITIONS 1056 (2d ed. 1995) (asserting that fairness opinions have become common place in
public company acquisitions as a result of Delaware caselaw).
211. Interview with Lawyer #18, at 4.
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whether to allocate any consideration to common in response to Trados and whether to
consider the case at all.212 If plaintiffs' lawyers are not motivated by the damages from
startup litigation in most cases, the views of the Delaware judiciary may ultimately figure
less prominently in board deliberations as a matter of habit. 2 13
In addition to resource constraints, Silicon Valley's distinctive capital structure may
diminish the stature of Delaware fiduciary law for startups. Corporate law theory
sometimes conceptualizes common shareholders as vulnerable outsiders.214 With limited
ability to influence corporate decision making, these outsiders may deserve special
protection through fiduciary duties.215 Common shareholders, therefore, are the natural
plaintiffs in fiduciary litigation.
But in Silicon Valley the founders and employees who hold the bulk of common
shares are also holders of essential human capital.
Startup boards and potential acquirers
generally want "the team" and are sensitive to founder and employee incentives.21 Even
when the company is sold, continuing compensation arrangements are part of the deal for
most common shareholders, and it is presumed that the vast majority of common
shareholders will sign on to an exit.218 This leaves the "cats and dogs"-estranged founders
and former employees holding small stakes-as the potential plaintiffs. 2 19 Accordingly, a
litigated common-preferred conflict is a "corner case."220
Even the structure of modem legal practice in Silicon Valley reflects, or perhaps
contributes to, Delaware's diminished signal strength in the startup ecosystem. As
described in Part III, the startup lawyers who design a company's governance apparatus
and guide the board through most exits defer to other specialists for deep understanding of
Delaware fiduciary law.221 To be clear, these startup lawyers are familiar with Trados and
do discuss fiduciary law with their clients.222 But they also describe caselaw as somewhat
peripheral to their practice and focus their attention on the financing conventions and other
matters clients presumably value most. 223

212. See supra Part IV.C.4 (discussing how litigation risk results in allocations to common); Part IV.C.1
(discussing how litigation risk influences the degree of attention Trados receives); Interview with Lawyer #8, at
2 (stating that there may not be much money in suing under a Trados claim); Interview with Lawyer #16, at 3

(reporting that a board will sometimes go ahead with a sale to which Trados might apply because there is little
litigation risk).
213.

See Interview with Lawyer #16, at 2 (explaining that public companies have "better process" because

it is a more litigious environment).
214. See Jeffrey Gordon, The Mandatory Structure of CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1549, 1556-64
(1989) (summarizing and critiquing an "investor protection" rationale for mandatory fiduciary duties to
shareholder). For an informative application of the investor protection rationale to startups, see Korsmo, supra

note 6, at 1208-11.
215. See Korsmo, supra note 6, at 1208-11.
216. See Pollman, supranote 6, at 34-37 (discussing the distinctive composition of the common shareholder
base in startups).
217. See supra notes 124-126 and accompanying text.

218.

See id.

219.

See supra note 130 (explaining the term "cats and dogs" in reference to shareholders); supra notes 149-

150 and accompanying text (describing the likely plaintiffs in a claim under Trados).
220. Interview with Lawyer #4, at 2.
221. See supra Part II1.B (describing the practice focus of the interviewees).
222.

See supra Part IV.A (reporting that the interviewees are familiar with Trados).

223.

See supra Part I11.B (discussing Delaware law and M&A specialists).
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Putting it all together, we might place Silicon Valley in the middle of a continuum of
judicial signal strength. At one end are highly responsive public companies, under constant
threat of litigation and represented by specialists in Delaware jurisprudence.224 At the
opposite end, we might place small businesses or individuals who use Delaware entities
Silicon Valley might fall somewhere in between. Startup lawyers
only intermittently.
and their clients regularly engage with routine aspects of Delaware corporate law and also
know and consider seminal cases like Trados. But a combination of resource constraints,
litigation environment, and other considerations mean that startups are unlikely to optimize
fully for fiduciary law.
2. Implicationsfor DelawareJurisprudence
If one accepts this account of moderate judicial influence, how should it affect
Delaware jurisprudence? In this Subpart, I argue for (1) more clarity in defining the
parameters of fairness review and (2) judicial guidance rooted in the practicalities of
customary practice rather than comparison to public company standards.
To lay the groundwork for these recommendations, first consider some basic features
of Delaware corporate law. Broadly, the court faces a tradeoff between preventing
corporate mismanagement throu h judicial scrutiny and mitigating litigation abuse through
Features of corporate litigation make it especially
judicial deference to boards.
susceptible to litigation abuse,227 so courts try to condition judicial intervention on strong
indicia of managerial abuse, such as clear conflicts of interest.228 Only claims that feature
these hallmarks of managerial misconduct survive motion to dismiss and proceed to
discove2. Other claims are subject to the business judgment rule and never see the light
of day.
Within this general framework, the court is forced to make other tradeoffs. For
example, the court can announce bright-line rules that give corporate managers clear
guidance on how to avoid or survive judicial scrutiny (and give plaintiffs lawyers clear
guidance on which claims to not bother bringing). But such clear definition might also
provide managers and their counsel a roadmap to evade regulation through contrived (but
technically compliant) actions. Delaware courts might intentionally retain some
224. See Ronald J. Gilson, The Fine Art of Judging: William T. Allen, 22 DEL. J. CORP. L. 914, 915-18
(1997) (describing transactional lawyers and their clients as highly responsive to Delaware law in the context of
public company mergers); Savitt, supra note 204, at 574 (discussing the high rate of litigation challenging public
company mergers) (citing Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Takeover Litigation in 2011, at 2 (Feb. 2,
2012) (unpublished manuscript), availableat http:// ssm.com/abstract-1 998482).
225. Those parties might face resource constraints more severe than startups and might use lawyers who
infrequently study entity law because their practice is less specialized or is specialized in areas where entity law
is a minor aspect of the overall representation. For example, Delaware limited liability companies ('LLCs") are

used in a wide variety of contexts. See Peter Molk, ProtectingLLC Owners While PreservingLLC Flexibility, 51
U.C. DAVis L. REV. 2129, 2141-46 (2018) (observing that LLC investors and their attorneys exhibit varying
levels of sophistication).

226.
review).
227.
228.
229.

Cable, supra note 22, at 90-95 (discussing the function of the business judgment rule and fairness
See id at 92-93.
Id. at 90-91.
See id at 90-92 (describing how standards of review affect pre-trial motions).
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ambiguity-good faith and the like-as an entry point for policing this kind of sham
compliance.230 Because of this delicate balance between specificity and vagueness, one
prominent jurist describes judicial lawmaking as a primarily "artistic enterprise."231
In the context of these difficult tradeoffs, one can see why the court emphasizes
procedural cleansing in its broader jurisprudence. In recent decades, Delaware courts have
reiterated that approval of independent board committees or disinterested shareholders
provides a "path back" to the business judgment rule.232 A board's attempt at procedural
cleansing does not remove all ambiguity from the court's analysis-it still must assess
independence, disinterestedness, and other procedural issues. But courts are relatively
comfortable with these squarely procedural questions,233 allowing dismissal of many
claims before they accrue substantial hold-up value. Where corporate boards have capacity
to take full advantage of this procedural self-help, the court can leave fiduciary principles
more open-ended without leaving the door wide open for litigation abuse.
This Article suggests the need for a different balance point in Silicon Valley. Board
composition, capital structure, economic reality, and resulting habit conspire against
procedural cleansing.234 Boards do confer with counsel and do what they can to spruce up
235
.
236
but they are often willing to roll the dice on fairness review.
process in the moment,
The court, in essence, loses an ally in mitigating the cost of ambiguous fiduciary law.
In this circumstance, the court should be cautious about its customary vagueness. In
particular, it should be as clear as possible regarding what precisely triggers faimess. The
point of this move towards clarity is not necessarily to influence corporate managers-after
all, they are not as responsive as they could be here. Instead, the primary purpose of
increased clarity is to send a signal to the court's other target audience: the plaintif's bar.
Even the court's dictum could go a long way in identifying the claims not worth bringing
in the first instance. 237
That is not to say that the court should give up altogether on providing guidance to
boards. After all, the court's sharpest criticisms in Trados got through to the Silicon Valley

230. See Allen, supra note 56, at 898 (asserting that bright-line rules carry a "risk that agents-such as
corporate management-might deploy such well-defined rules cleverly (and technically correctly), but with the
purpose in mind not to advance long-term interests of investors, but to pursue some different purpose"); Fisch,

supranote 56, at 1081-85 (asserting that under-inclusive rules will be "easy to avoid through careful planning").
231. Allen, supra note 56, at 898.
232.

D. Gordon Smith, The Modern Business Judgment Rule, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON MERGERS AND

AcQUISITIONS 83, 84 (Claire A. Hill & Steven Davidoff Solomon eds., 2016); see also Robert B. Little & Joseph
A. Orien, Determining the Likely Standard of Review in Delaware M&A Transactions, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON

CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/04/28/determining-thelikely-standard-of-review-in-delaware-ma-transactions-2
(describing the standards of review, and the steps
necessary to obtain the benefit of the business judgement rule, in various transactional contexts).

233.

See Allen, supra note 56, at 900-01 (reporting a relatively high degree of confidence in advising

corporate actors how a special committee should operate).
234. See supra Part V.A.1 (discussing the muted impact ofjudicial pronouncements in Silicon Valley and
the infrequency of procedural cleansing).

235. See supra Part IV.C.3 (discussing how Trados affects board deliberations).
236. See supra notes 160-161 (reporting that procedural cleansing is often impractical).
237. Cf Savitt, supra note 204, at 576-77 (discussing caselaw regarding attorney's fees and what it "signals"
to the plaintiffs' bar); Matthew D. Cain et al., The Shifting Tides of Merger Litigation, 71 VAND. L. REv. 603,
619-30 (2018) (describing how litigation patterns were affected by recent Delaware case law and other legal
reforms).
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corporate community and incrementally improved board process.238 But the court should
be aware of its moderate influence and focus on identifying achievable hallmarks of fair
process. If Delaware is going to influence startup boards, it will have to be through rightsized recommendations. 39 One way to develop achievable guidance is to root it in existing
practices.
Of course, one might fairly ask why the responsiveness of Silicon Valley should be
of particular concern to the Delaware judiciary. If startup boards do not prioritize Delaware
caselaw and are willing to stomach the resulting litigation costs, why should Delaware
courts bend over backwards for startup boards?
Most basically, Delaware courts have demonstrated that they do care. Their opinions
reflect an interest in understanding how distinctive features of the Silicon Valley business
environment affect application of Delaware law.240 Phrased in more instrumental terms,
Delaware courts have an interest in preserving their dominant position in the competition
for corporate charter business. While Delaware entities now predominate in Silicon
Valley, 41 it is hard to believe based on these interviews that entrepreneurs or venture
capital funds view Delaware entities as indispensable. Nuisance suits are a cost that may
justify switching costs at some level.
Finally, it is important to note that this is not a recommendation for a relaxation of
substantive law. There may be reasons to subsidize the innovation economy, but lowering.
the standards for management integrity seems an ill-conceived approach. The point of this
analysis is to highlight that ambiguity has a different cost in the distinctive milieu of Silicon
Valley, which may justify paying additional attention to the boundaries of emerging
caselaw.
B. Application to Trados
Having identified these guiding principles, what does it all mean for Trados? This
Subpart addresses that question by sketching out what tightly prescribed fairness review
and achievable board process would look like in a disappointing sale of a startup.
Importantly, these suggestions are grounded in the interviewees' customary practice.
They respond to ambiguities that surfaced in the interviews, and they incorporate
customary board procedure described by the interviewees. Existing practices, of course,
will not always align with the court's expectations-sometimes the court plays a formative
role in establishing norms. But existing practice can still be a useful startingpoint in the
court's efforts to guide directors and their advisors. Practically, the court can know that
such guidance is achievable. Normatively, guidance grounded in customary practice has
242
majoritarian credentials.

238.
239.

See supra Part IV.C (discussing the moderate impact of Trados on board process).
See Pollman, supra note 6, at 56 ("Traditional notions of 'fair process' and 'fair dealing' should adjust

to calibrate expectations to the startup environment.").
240. See supra text accompanying notes 43-49 (describing the Trados court's attentiveness to features of

Silicon Valley).
241.

See Brian Broughman et al., Delaware Law as Lingua Franca:Theory andEvidence, 57 J.L. & ECON.

865, 872 (2014) (finding that most companies in a dataset of venture-capital backed startups were incorporated
in Delaware).

242.

The view that corporate law should and does consist of majoritarian defaults is sometimes referred to

as a "contractarian" approach. For a comprehensive analysis of the contractarian approach and its various sub-
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To better situate the discussion, consider a hypothetical startup (Startup A) that
produces and sells a home electronics device. The company hires a talented team,
completes product development and beta testing, and begins selling the product. The sales
environment is challenging because Apple just launched a similar product. Along the way,
two venture capital funds pitch in $20 million and receive a liquidation preference in that
amount. The company's six-person board consists of two founders, a CEO recruited
through the investors' professional networks, a representative of each of the venture capital
funds, and a technology company veteran mutually selected by the venture capital funds
and the founders. The common shareholder base includes the founders, a syndicate of early
angel investors who received common shares, and a former employee who exercised a
stock option grant.
1. Tightening Trados Triggers
As a practical matter, many interviewees adopt a broad reading of Tradosperceiving litigation risk whenever preferred shareholders receive disproportionate
consideration because of a liquidation preference.243 Yet, several interviewees express
concern that this approach is too quick to find conflict as an empirical and conceptual
matter. They note that companies fail hard and frequently in Silicon Valley, and it is a bad
day for all involved when preferred holders get pennies (or a few dimes) on the dollar. Like
some commentators, 244 some interviewees perceive meaningful preferred-common
conflict only in narrower circumstances where preferred holders receive most of their
liquidation preference and, therefore, have more to lose by continuing. 24 5
Returning to hypothetical Startup A, assume that Amazon offers to buy the company
(in a play for its technology and talent) for $5 million, resulting in a $5 million payout of
liquidation preference to preferred holders and no payout to common holders. The sale
proceeds might be enough to motivate a disappointed angel investor or former employee
to threaten litigation and make a grab for hold-up value. But is salvaging $5 million on a
$20 million investment enough to motivate the VC-affiliated directors to forego
meaningful prospects for a turnaround? 246 What if the offer is just $2.5 million?

species, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, Opting Out of FiduciaryDuties: A Response to the AntiContractarians,65 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990). The contractarian approach was heavily debated in a symposium
issue in the Columbia Law Review featuring a number of corporate law scholars. See generally Lucian Arye
Bebehuck, The Debate on ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989) (discussing

symposium contributions by Frank Easterbrook & Daniel Fischel, Melvin Eisenberg, Jeffrey Gordon, John
Coffee, Robert Clark, Lewis Komhauser, Ralph Winter, Fred McChesney, Roberta Romano, Jonathan Macey,
Anthony Kronman, and Oliver Hart).
243. See supra Part IV.C.1 (reporting the interviewees' view of when Trados applies).
244. See Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 1875-76 (associating common-preferred conflicts with the
"moderate downside" and asserting that at the "extreme downside" things are "markedly easier" because "there
are no allocational issues worth pressing"). In previous scholarship, I suggested an even narrower reading by

emphasizing that Trados had some especially bad facts for the defendants in the form of testimony by one director
admitting that he lost interest in the company and wanted to shut it down to turn his attention to more promising

projects. Cable, supra note 22, at 73-77 (identifying a novel "opportunity-cost conflict" in the Trados fact pattern
and the court's reasoning). I put that interpretation aside for purposes of this Article because it did not appear in
the interviews.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 143-147.
246. The conventional wisdom has been that liquidation preferences are valuable to venture capital funds
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The court should address the ambiguity surrounding what precisely triggers fairness
review under Trados. Even if Delaware jurists strategically prefer "mushy" principles over
algorithmic rules,247 articulating some limits on the scope of Trados would be helpful. In
other areas, Delaware courts have provided illustrative parameters without forfeiting the
24 8
possibility of revisiting the issue based on the totality of circumstances.
As a start, the court could demarcate some level of investor loss that puts the sale
outside of Trados. The guidance could identify a presumptive threshold (for example:
"ordinarily Trados will not apply where the preferred receives less than 25% of its
liquidation preference") 249 and also provide examples of factors that can override the
presumption (for example: "except where the company has sufficient operating capital to
execute an articulated plan for a turnaround").
Though this is a modest suggestion, it is an important one for striking the correct
balance between policing managerial misconduct and preventing litigation abuse. The
stakes are high when defining the parameters of fairness review because permitting such
250
judicial scrutiny imbues even meritless claims with holdup value.
2. FairProcess Informed by Customary Process
Having considered when fairness is triggered under Trados, the next question is what
the case requires of a board. Can the customary practice described by the interviewees
provide a roadmap for fair process?
Customary practice provides at least two insights. Most convincingly, qualitative
assessment of the company's prospects, rather than formal valuation, should ordinarily be
appropriate for startups. More tenuously, allocating consideration to common, rather than
forgoing the merger, should be recognized as consistent with fair process in those hard
cases where the prospects of a turnaround are nontrivial but still speculative.
a. Assessing Common-Continuation Value
Returning again to hypothetical Startup A, assume Amazon values the company's
technology and workforce more highly and offers $18 million in a merger transaction
(against the $20 million liquidation preference). At these numbers, we are more squarely

because of the incentives they create for entrepreneurs (discouraging underwhelming exits) and their role in
mitigating information asymmetry. See Abraham J.B. Cable, Fendingfor Themselves: Why Securities Regulations

Should Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 124-25 (2010) (discussing how liquidation
preferences allow entrepreneurs to signal their confidence in achieving larger exits). Investment returns appear to
be driven predominately by a small number of large exits, rather than the amount of liquidation preference from
more modest exits. See Cable, supra note 144, at 228-33 (discussing why venture capital investors pursue "high-

risk, high-reward exits").
247. See supra Part II.B (describing the Delaware judiciary's normative/narrative style).
248. For example, courts have provided guidance on what constitutes an acceptable break-up fee in a merger
agreement by specifying a range (based on percentage of deal value) that will "generally" be acceptable. See

McMillan v. Intercargo Corp., 768 A.2d 492, 505 (Del. Ch. 2000). Specifying this generally acceptable range,
however, does not preclude the court from also interrogating other factors such as the structure of the fee. See id.
249. As a reference point, one interviewee suggests that Trados would be a significant concern if a merger
results in recovery of 80% of the liquidation preference, but would not be a major topic of conversation with the

board if the preferred received only 2% of the liquidation preference. See Interview with Lawyer #13, at 2.
250. See Cable, supra note 22, at 90-92 (discussing the effect of standards of review upon pretrial motions).
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in the moderate-downside fact pattern, where preferred holders are arguably incentivized
to protect the liquidation preference and push for a sale. Assume further that company
counsel is skeptical that the transaction can be cleansed by an independent board committee
because there may not be even one independent director-the founders will likely receive
compensation packages from Amazon and the CEO and industry expert are potentially
beholden to the venture capital funds. Disinterested shareholder approval is likely a
nonstarter based on these facts. Assuming the founders do not qualify because of their
compensation packages, the angel investors and former employee have no motivation to
be responsive. What should we expect of the board in these circumstances? How should
the board evaluate whether zero dollars is a fair outcome for the common, chief
beneficiaries of the board's fiduciary duties under a rule of common maximization?
At least one Delaware jurist asserts there will be instances where wringing out value
for the common constitutes unnecessary "casino-like gambling."251 Because the pure logic
of common maximization does not reveal any obvious boundaries, 252 it is up to the court
to explain how a board can legitimately determine that common-continuation value is so
speculative that it may be disregarded in approving a merger.
One possibility, discussed by the Trados court, is for the board to obtain a fairness
opinion that applies a variety of recognized valuation methods to show zero or near-zero
value for the common stock. 253 Such valuations are ubiquitous in public company
mergers.

254

On the facts of Trados, there may have been valid reasons why the court criticized the
Trados board for failing to obtain a fairness opinion. Trados was not your average startup.
It was a "roll-up" (combination) of several established businesses.255 It had a long
256
257
258
It was selling for a
and cash in the bank.
a stable business,
operating history,
proposed $60 million-a significant (though disappointing) amount for the early 2000s
market. 259 In the court's view, Trados had plateaued rather than failed. 260 It was a
circumstance where the company may have had the resources to invest in a respectable
fairness opinion and sufficient operating history to provide useful inputs for a valuation.
Apparently, even the acquirer subscribed to this view and pushed unsuccessfully for a
fairness opinion.

261

251. Strine, supranote 6, at 2038.
252. See supra note 68 (summarizing responses to common-maximization in legal scholarship).
253. See In re Trados Inc. S'holder Litig., 73 A.3d 17, 65 (Del. Ch. 2013) (considering the board's decision
to forego a fairness opinion).
254. See Steven M. Davidoff, FairnessOpinions, 55 Am. U. L. REv. 1557, 1563-73 (2006) (discussing the
prevalence of fairness opinions following the Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom).
255. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 23 (describing Trados's history of acquisitions).
256. See id. at 21 ("At the time, Trados differed significantly from the stereotypical dot-com startup. Trados
had been around for sixteen years and sold a successful desktop product.").
257. See id. (describing Trados's business strategy and results).
258. See id. at 32 ("Trados achieved an operating profit of $165,000, and its cash balance exceeded $5
million, beating budget.").
259. The average size of exit transaction for a venture-capital backed company has increased substantially
in recent years. The median size of exit was $43.7 million in 2004 and reached $90 million by 2016. See NVCA
YEARBOOK, supra note 81.

260. See In re Trados, 73 A.3d at 65, 67 ("Contrary to the defendants' exaggerated trial testimony, the
Company was not headed for a cliff, and there was a realistic possibility that it could self-fund its business plan.").
261. Seeidat65.
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But in the ordinary case, boards are not faced with a choice between sale and pivot.
Interviewees report that boards often choose between sale and dissolution.262 In this more
ordinary context, it is easier to understand why fairness opinions are the exception and not
263
the rule. The cost may be disproportionate and the value questionable.
In this environment, boards consider common-continuation value in a more
qualitative way, rooted in the specifics of the startup business environment. They consider
indicia of company failure: defecting employees, waning demand for the company's
products, lack of alternative exit transactions, depleted cash, and a lack of additional
financing sources.264 Among these factors, one can imagine a lack of financing sources
being a deciding factor in many cases. It takes cash to accomplish a turnaround, and current
investors cannot be forced to continue funding.
The next time the court re-visits the Trados fact pattern, it should articulate what fair
process might mean in the ordinary case. The interviewees' description of a qualitative
assessment, grounded in the world of startups, can serve as the starting point.
b. EndorsingAllocations to Common?
What the board should do when there are legitimate, though speculative, prospects
for a turnaround is perhaps the most conceptually difficult question. Interviewees suggest
one possibility-allocating consideration to common and completing the merger. Whether
this element of customary practice should be considered fair dealing, in light of the court's
endorsement of common maximization, is not such an easy question. Perhaps the most we
can say is that the practice is weakly indicative of fair dealing.
Return one more time to hypothetical Startup A. Assume that the board undertakes a
qualitative assessment of common-continuation value in accordance with Subpart V.B.2.a
above. That assessment reveals that the company has enough cash to continue operating
for six months; if it does not sell to Amazon, there is still a chance it can enter into a
strategic partnership with Amazon to access better distribution channels; and Apple has
botched its product launch. In short, there is a plausible but improbable path forward to
creating value for common shareholders.
Commentary to date might imply that common maximization compels the board to
decline the merger and attempt the turnaround. For example, commentators have described
the board as facing a decision between accepting the merger or "continuing" the firm.265
262.
263.

See supra text accompanying note 146.
Commentators have questioned the reliability of fairness opinions and the weight they are given by

Delaware courts in cases concerning public company acquisitions. See Davidoff, supra note 254, at 1573-78,
1606-11 (discussing the subjectivity of fairness opinions and summarizing critiques of fairness opinions by other
commentators). There are reasons to be even more skeptical of the reliability of fairness opinions for acquisitions
of startups. Fairness opinions are frequently based on discounted cash flow analysis based on future projections.

See id. at 1574-76. Future projections are likely to be especially speculative for an emerging technology or
product. Other frequently used valuation techniques, such as analysis of comparable companies and control
premiums, are based on stock price information of the target company or comparable businesses. See id. This
stock price information is not available for a startup and may not be available for its competitors.
264. See supra notes 167-171 (discussing factors that boards consider in evaluating common-continuation
value). See also Interview with Lawyer #19, at 3 (stating that a board can sell a company under Trados if it has
talked to diverse funding sources, pursued different strategic directions, and talked to strategic partners without
success).
265. E.g., Bartlett, supra note 6, at 295 (describing a "dilemma of whether to continue or liquidate a
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But that does not appear to be customary practice. Instead, the interviewees report that
boards more likely arrange allocations to common by negotiating with the preferred holders
to concede some liquidation preference. 266 The merger happens, but at a cost to preferred
holders. In the hypothetical above, for example, the board might approve the merger, but
conditioned on the preferred shares waiving enough of their preference to allocate
$500,000 to common shareholders.
If the merger is challenged by the disgruntled common shareholders, what should a
court make of this allocation to common? Is it meaningful evidence of fair process?
In theory, common shareholders should be indifferent as to whether the company
actually continues or just pays out the expected value of continuation. It may even be that
the typical holder of common stock in a startup-a founder or employee with significant
human capital wrapped up in a single company-would favor the immediate payout
compared to the risk of continuing.
From this perspective, allocations to common are
consistent with common maximization if they reasonably approximate commoncontinuation value.
But, practically speaking, allocating to common and continuing with the merger feels
like a concession to the preferred holders. A case that reaches the court will likely not
involve actual bargaining by the affected common holders themselves (a shareholder who
directly negotiates a payment will presumably sign away his or her claims). Instead, a
conflicted board calculates and negotiates the payout on behalf of the common stock. They
likely do so without benefit of an expert valuation or in circumstances where such
valuations may be unreliable.268 Common holders might rightfully be skeptical that the
payout equals the expected value of a turnaround.
One might even argue that the customary practice is inconsistent with common
maximization because it is no better than a compromise of common and preferred interests.
The preferred holders do not get their full liquidation preference. The common holders do
not get to see the project through. Instead, the board arguably eschews common
maximization and tries to fulfill fiduciary duties to all shareholders-thefavored phrasing
of some interviewees when asked about the beneficiary question. Corporate law theorists
have sometimes ascribed such a mediating role to corporate boards, but not without
controversy.2 6 9
struggling firm"); Bratton & Wachter, supra note 6, at 1888 (describing the board's decision as a choice between
immediate sale and "delay"); Cable, supra note 22, at 62-77 (comparing expected values of accepting a merger
and attempting a turnaround).

266.
267.

See supra Part IV.C.4 (describing allocations to common).
Matthew Wansley, Beach Money Exits, 45 J. CORP. L. 151, 167-70 (2019) (identifying reasons why

founders and employees might favor exits that venture-capital investors view as insufficient).
268. See supra notes 263-264 and accompanying text (describing fairness opinions as rare in startup exits).
269. See generally Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85
VA. L. REV. 247 (1999) (arguing that a board of directors serves as a "mediating hierarchy" to solve incentive
problems associated with team production). But see Stephen M. Bainbridge, DirectorPrimacy: The Means and

Ends of CorporateGovernance, 97 Nw. U. L. REV. 547, 601-05 (2003) (critiquing Blair and Stout's formulation
due to the agency costs that might arise when purporting to serve a variety of constituencies); David Millon, New
Game Plan or Business as Usual?A Critique of the Team ProductionModel of CorporateLaw, 86 VA. L. REV.

1001 (2000) (critiquing Blair and Stout's formulation on descriptive and normative grounds). The practice also
bears some resemblance to bargaining models of the board advanced by other corporate law scholars. According
to these models, parties to venture capital financings overcome incomplete contracting problems by vesting
control in a board that engages in intra-board renegotiations as more information emerges. See generallyBartlett,
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As long as the court is committed to common maximization, an allocation to common
may be only weakly indicative of fair process. Without some concrete analysis that the
value approximates common-continuation value (an analysis that will often be missing),
such an allocation is only rough justice. But still, it is a concession by the preferred, in the
form of foregone liquidation preference, and a benefit to common beyond their baseline
entitlement. And it is a solution to a difficult circumstance-a high-risk business venture
that is failing to meet initial lofty expectations-that appears to fall within Silicon Valley
norms. Even in the context of rigorous fairness review, boards need some room to navigate
this thorny end of a company's lifecycle.
VI. CONCLUSION

By incorporating in Delaware, Silicon Valley entrepreneurs subject themselves to a
distant regulator. At some level, it is a surprising pairing of a famously maverick business
community270 with a court that traces its roots to ancient fiduciary principles.271 Its success
hinges on the lawyers who counsel entrepreneurs through key points in a startup's lifecycle.
The challenge for courts and researchers studying the efficacy of caselaw is that this
counseling moment takes place in private and leaves little record. This case study tries to
shed light on this crucial moment of implementation. It shows how the court's message
can get through loudly, if not entirely clearly, and it offers suggestions for improving signal
strength in this distinctive environment.

supra note 6; Brian J. Broughman, The Role ofIndependentDirectors in Startup Firms, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 461

(2010). In these bargaining models, however, it is envisioned that the board members will, within limits, be
permitted to advance the interests of a particular constituency that designated that director to the board (e.g.,
investors or founders). See Bartlett, supranote 6, at 260 (presenting a model in which "directors might bargain to
maximize cash flows to a particular constituency (e.g., a preferred stockholder or common stockholders)" while
owing "an ultimate duty to maximize the value of the firm"). In contrast, the customary practice described by the
interviewees contemplates a uniform obligation for all directors and a facilitating role as opposed to actual intra-

board bargaining.
270. Cf, Elizabeth Pollman & Jordan M. Barry, Regulating Entrepreneurship,90 So. CAL. L. REv. 383,
398 (2017) (identifying startups that take advantage of legal grey areas and "beg forgiveness" rather than "ask[ing]
for permission"); Abraham J.B. Cable, InstitutionalDisruption: The Rise ofthe Reformer Startup, 12 HASTINGS

Bus. J. 1, 11 (2015) (discussing the startup ecosystem as "an institution that enables long-shot efforts to unseat
incumbents"); Herment Taneja, The Era of "Move Fast and Break Things" Is Over, HARV. Bus. REv. (Jan. 22,

2019) ("Many of today's entrepreneurs live by Facebook founder Mark Zuckerberg's now-famous motto: 'Move
fast and break things."').
271. See William T. Quillen & Michael Hanrahan, A Short History of the Delaware Court of Chancery-

1792-1992, 18 DEL. J. CORP. L. 819 (1993).

